| THE TRUTH |
| JUNE 15, 2011 |
| We Present the Truth, But You Do Not Comprehend By Dennis L. Pearson (c) 2009 by Dennis L. Pearson --- All Rights Reserved --- No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the author. PART FIVE PREFACE Historically, backwater has been known to discharge from the rain submerged and overloaded Jordan Creek, Trout Creek and Little Lehigh - Section One Trunk Sewers (Constituting the lower portion of the Allentown Wastewater Interceptor System) and flood private property immediately adjacent to such trunk sewers, the cause diagnosed as too high level of sewage entering the wet wall of a pumping station associated with operations at the Kline’s Island Wastewater Treatment Plant. Consequently, it would be advantageous for Allentown in light of its December 22, 1969 agreement with the Lehigh County Authority (LCA) to resolve the before stated problem. After all, as the LCA system expanded toward full development and its sewage flows approached design values, the before mentioned homegrown backwater effect would become more pronounced and extensive if nothing else was done to otherwise resolve the problems. (See FIGURES THREE AND FOUR) *** *** *** It is recognized and certain amount of infiltration of groundwater and inflow of surface drainage (I/I) enters nearly every sanitary sewer system. And, of course, such extraneous flows increase significantly during and after maximum storms. The content of these flows consisted of raw sewage according to Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources estimates. Unfortunately, for those promoting growth in western Lehigh County, this fixed reality constitutes a barrier to continued commercial and residential growth upstream. That is, every gallon of I/I gained means a gallon of genuine sewage capacity not available for legitimate use. *** *** *** Most assuredly, the twin occurrences of I/I and upstream interceptor line bottlenecks or restrictions has served to guarantee that a Lehigh County Authority- City of Allentown public highway froe sewage would at times become surcharged (that is, becomes overloaded) and would discharge its contents on land and in stream immediately adjacent to its gravity flow course. Understandably, the LCA-Allentown public highway through Allentown’s Lehigh Parkway for incoming sewage and wastewater derived from and for the benefit of Sewered developments in western Lehigh County has been a source of longstanding complaint. Indeed, sewage overflows have occurred in the Little Lehigh Creek (a major source of Allentown’s drinking water) in the vicinity of Schrieber’s Bridge – that is, the junction of the 36-inch Emmaus Interceptor and the 27-inch Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer. Then too, such overflows have also occurred at Keck’s Bridge where the LCA’s 36-inch sewer line for Western Lehigh County connects into the City’s 24-inch Emmaus Interceptor from Emmaus and Salisbury Township. The problem occurring at two manholes, which are located on the north bank of the Little Lehigh Creek. One manhole located approximately 160 yards upstream from Keck’s Bridge, the other 230 yards upstream. We note – this public highway can handle all sewage flows during normal periods of use. However, during peak flow periods (mainly wet weather conditions), the incoming flow historically has exceeded the carrying capacity of the Allentown Interceptor. The consequences being – the interceptor becomes surcharged and discharges raw sewage into the Little Lehigh Creek (a “Conservation Stream.) Indeed, the problem was and may still be inevitable because the existing interceptor was built in bottlenecks. That is, places where larger, newer lines send sewage into smaller lines thereby causing predictable back-ups. What-is-more, increased flows increase the hydraulic pressure within the line thereby requiring relief at some point when restrictions occur. Naturally, this relief ultimately would occur at the weakest point or points in the system; and of course, it is inevitable that step-by-step symptomatic treatment of a serious problem might not render adequate resolution to the whole problem. In other words, the systematic sealing of manhole castings including the replacement of bolts in covers of watertight castings in certain manholes along the interceptor might work to transfer the problem elsewhere rather then promote permanent relief; and more importantly, such remedial activity might be counter-productive toward continued Sewered development upstream. INSTALLMENT ONE Harrison E. Forker, a colleague of mine in the Lehigh Valley Council for Regional Livability, Inc. has made comment in notes dated, December 5,1983 in regard to a Scott Bieber by-lined article appearing in a local Allentown newspaper. Forker inferred that the infiltration/inflow (I/I) problems as described by Bieber for the Keck’s Bridge Area was not just isolated to the Keck’s Bridge location but also existed at other points in the inter-connecting Lehigh County Authority (LCA) – City of Allentown wastewater collection system. Consequently, the problem was not just one that concerned solely the LCA, but also an Allentown concern as well. Indeed, Forker was right! After all, the operators of Allentown’s wastewater treatment plant needed to determine the characteristics of the incoming flows in order to process it properly. *** *** *** What Forker did not reveal December 5, 1983 was Allentown’s past concern in regard to the infiltration of groundwater into its system prior to the LCA hook-up and prior to the Daddona era in Allentown’s history. *** *** *** Metcalf & Eddy’s “Report to Allentown Authority, Allentown, Pennsylvania, On Enlargement of Sewage Treatment Plant” --- September 1964 noted that pumping records at the Kline’s Island Wastewater Treatment Plant showed an almost immediate increase in flows during times of rainfalls with intensities greater than 0.1 inch an hour. Consequently, the Allentown City Council in 1965 felt the need to check the possibility of excessive groundwater infiltration into the interceptor and collector system. Accordingly, Metcalf & Eddy was authorized by resolution No. 20487, dated January 5, 1965 to perform the following service: “Make measurements of sewage flow in sewers at 14 stations during wet weather, then repeat the measurement again at the same hour and place on a dry-weather day one week later. A third series of measurements were to be obtained on a dry-weather day during the peak period of the day. These measurements were to consist of depth of sewage flow in sewers and velocity measurements at each of the 14 stations.” Unfortunately, rainfall conditions during the gauging period were not conducive to producing maximum wet-weather sewage flows. Gaugings were made in the midst of a “most unusual and long-sustained drought.” Not only had there been a marked deficiency in rainfall in the months proceeding the gauging study, but also during the months of July 1965 through April 1966, when the gauging was made. The total rainfall deficiency was 11.56 inches. During this period, stream flows and groundwater levels were unusually low. As a result, eventhough substantial amounts of rain fell on some of the gauging days, flow conditions in the sewers could not be assumed to represent the conditions that would occur during long-sustained periods of heavy rainfall and high groundwater levels. In any case, Metcalf & Eddy’s “Report to City of Allentown, Pennsylvania on 1965-66 Trunk Sewer Gauging” was released to the Allentown Council July 2, 1969. *** *** *** (Please note – Joseph S. Daddona having succeeded Lloyd E. Grammes as Allentown City Councilman And Allentown Director of Streets and Public Improvements in 1968 was the man vested with the responsibility of accepting and reviewing the report in 1969.) *** *** *** On the positive side, Metcalf & Eddy concluded the observed flows from storm water were not caused by excessive infiltration as formally believed, but were due primarily to roof drain connections and needed repairs on some trunks. But negatively, Metcalf & Eddy noted that discharges from sewers in low areas of Allentown had been caused by water backing up from the wet wall at the Sewage Treatment Plant. A study of the sewerage system showed that such flooding was believed to be caused by allowing the sewage level in the wet well to reach a too high an elevation. For example, if the wet well was allowed to fill to Elevation 7.5 or higher the backwater would flood out the trunk sewers for some distance. Under such circumstances, Metcalf & Eddy expected the Jordan Creek Trunk Sewer to be submerged for about one mile from the sewage treatment plant. Similarly, the flooding in the Trout Creek Trunk Sewer would extend about one- quarter mile from its mouth, and the Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer would be affected up to the 24-inch river crossing at the upper end of Section One. Then too, Metcalf & Eddy admitted the flooding of these trunks would cause sewage to back-up in the lateral sewers and, in some cases, be forced back into private property. This worst-case scenario, of course, would encourage the formation of deposits in the laterals, as well in the trunks, and thus, increase cleaning costs. For that reason, Metcalf & Eddy recommended it would be advantageous for the city to maintain sufficiently low sewerage levels in the wet well as to avoid significant backwater effects. Why? As the Lehigh County Authority tributary area approached full development and the sewage flows approached design value, the problem would become more pronounced and expensive. *** *** *** In regard to the LCA – Allentown public highway for sewage through Allentown’ s Lehigh Parkway, Metcalf & Eddy predicted that Sections 1 & 2 of the Little Lehigh Creek Trunk Sewer would need relief at full development. This was especially true of Section 2, as the expected flows in 1990 would exceed the 1969 capacity by more then 50 percent. Peak flows beyond 1969 capacity would require a 30-inch relief line running from the junction of the Little Lehigh Creek Collection Sewer (also known as the Emmaus Interceptor) and the Little Lehigh Creek Trunk Sewer, Section 2, to the twin 24-inch pipe river crossing at the upper end of the Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer, Section 1, a distance of some 5,350 feet. But from the standpoint of long-range city livability and common sense environmental preservation, we must assert that the December 22, 1969 Sewage Agreement between Allentown and the LCA at the beginning of the Daddona era should not have given the LCA the free license to deteriorate Allentown’s Parkway/ watershed environment in order to provide relief to the LCA – Allentown public highway infrastructure. INSTALLMENT TWO Former United States President Richard M. Nixon in a message to Congress, August 1970 said: “We have treated our land as if it were a limitless resource. Traditionally, Americans have felt what they do with their own land is their own business. Today we are coming to realize that our land is finite. The uses to which our generation puts land can either expand or severely limit the choices our children will have. The time has come when we must accept the idea that none of us has a right to abuse the land, and that on the contrary society as a whole has a legitimate interest in proper land use.” In analysis, these remarks represent an activist position for regional or local land use planning from a President who was thought of as being moderate or slightly conservative in policies. Importantly, this presidential initiative would serve to heighten or spark land use debates (that is, agricultural versus residential, agricultural versus commercial or industrial, etc.) in perceived “metropolitan areas” where economic transformation or community metamorphosis activities had been planned or were in the stage of being implemented. In the Lehigh Valley, the post Korean War push for economic transformation and community metamorphosis had its economic justification in arguments advanced January 8, 1973 by the Lehigh County Commissioners in the midst of public debate over their advocation of a proposed Trexler Dam and reservoir on the Jordan Creek. (A project that in 1964 Allentown’s water consultant Morris & Knowles, Inc., Pittsburgh, had considered a feasible future source of raw water for the City of Allentown second only to the volume that could be obtained from the Lehigh River.) The Commissioner’s offering the contention that the Lehigh County might have to sacrifice its traditional agricultural ties in order to compete successfully with Philadelphia for economic development. However we note – the Commissioners apparently did not share the same opinions about the propriety or the benefits derived from the inducement or unwarranted growth. County Commissioner Donald B. Hoffman, in fact, was somewhat rhapsodic about the future tax benefits derived from potential building development in the County. His line of argument being that “tax dollars from a home was far superior to tax dollars derived from open land.” In other words, to Hoffman money issues rather than livability issues were far more important. On the other hand, George A. Stahl, then Chairman of the County Commissioners, was genuinely apologetic about the inducement of growth activities in the County. Stahl offering the following political defense: “ We don’t have a choice. These people keep coming in and building homes. We can’t stop the. It’s the position we’re in between Philadelphia and New York and Pittsburgh and Washington.” A message reminiscent of what Dr. James Cope said October 7, 1957. That is: “We can not stop the metropolitan age, we can only channel it. The Lehigh Valley must decide. What you have? What do you want? How do you get it? To this question Allentown Councilman Benjamin F. Howells expressed the following sentiments March 31, 1981 at a public forum sponsored by the Allentown-Lehigh County Greater Community Council: “Our first point involves the general question of growth in our region. The report (of the Greater Community Council) proceeds under a very large assumption that economic growth and development are in the best interest of Allentown and the Lehigh County. Growth may well be critical to the economic well being of this region, but that growth must meet certain criteria. It, first of all, must be reasonably controlled by entities interested in maintaining the quality of life in our region and dedicated to preserving our critical natural resources. The growth cannot be fueled by unreasoning municipal competition for the location of new housing, new factories, and new commercial centers.” Nevertheless, in spite of everything Ben Howells may publicly profess, given the tradition in the Lehigh Valley of fiercely independent local governments (three cities and numerous suburban and rural municipalities) growth in the Lehigh Valley, indeed, might be fueled by unreasoning municipal competition for the location of new housing, new factories, and new commercial centers. Consequently, the dream of uniting the distinct communities as one region to foster controlled growth activities has been resisted for years and may be resisted for many years to come. *** *** *** George A. Stahl further defined his above position in his booklet Lehigh County --- Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. He wrote: “The treat to our fertile farmland is real, for though Pennsylvania’s soil is among the richest in the Country, this irreplaceable resource is being covered by heavy developments or shopping centers. Shopping centers that are too often unneeded, serving mainly to steal business away from already developed downtown areas.” Some of these heavy developments included the location of new industries (that is, Kraftco Corporation and F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Company) in Upper Macungie Township. The effect of such new land use caused an eight-fold increase in land assessments on at least 43 tracts (comprising 802.9 acres) being active farmland and private residential units with modest to large front, side and back yards. The 802.9 acres carried an assessed valuation of $68,580 in 1972. But based upon industrial use evaluation, the assessed valuation in 1973 was $552,320. The upshot being, even if township and school tax rates remained the same, there would be a jump in real estate taxes from $3,024.62 in 1972 to $24,357.23 in 1973. Individually, Mabel Adams and Homer Zimmerman may have been hit the hardest. For example, Mabel Adam’s assessment on 213.2 acres went up from $16,260 in 1972 to $266,550 in 1973 resulting in a 1973 real estate tax bill of $11,754.85 as compared to $717,06 in 1972. Likewise, Homer Zimmerman’s assessment on 150.5 acres went up from $12,750 in 1972 to $87,490 in 1973 resulting in a 1973 real estate tax bill of $3,858.37 as compared to $562.28 in 1972. Of course, for all property owners affected, this eight-fold increase in property assessment was an unwelcome consequence of the new fixed reality in their lives. But we observe, for Homer Zimmerman and his wife Mary, this new fixed reality was served in double portions. That is, they were impacted negatively by the decision of the Lehigh County Authority and Upper Macungie Township planners to condemn for easement purposes a portion of their farm property to facilitate wastewater disposal needs of the newly constructed Kraftco Corporation creamery plant, in addition to the rise in their real estate tax assessment. The fact being, the new fixed reality immediately raised the question of fairness --- that is ---was it fair or moral for the County to assess F. & M. Schaefer and Kraftco undeveloped industrial use land at a lower amount per acre then smaller (industrial use?) tracts held by homeowners in the adjacent area? No wonder J. Bruce Mordaunt, a member of the Northwestern Lehigh Citizens Coalition and a future member of the Joint Planning Commission, Lehigh – Northampton Counties, in addressing the Trexler Dam Water Project issue January 31, 1973 stated that the County’s policy of “inducing growth and subsidizing it should be terminated.” Indeed, our interest is aroused. Whether such spot reassessment was pre- planned or incidental, Lehigh County could not have found a better way to clear out the area immediately adjacent to the new industry for further industrial growth. Truly, the County (and the Township that rezoned the tract from agricultural to industrial) severely limited the land use choices that the current owner of those properties or their heirs or successors had in the economic usage of land (which has either been incorporated or adjacent to land once controlled and owned by the late General Harry C. Trexler); and, what-is-more, in many cases the new assessment priced the land right out of the economical use for farming and forced the land’s sale for other economic usages. Statewide there was concern over the loss of farmland. For example – in 1974 the Pennsylvania Farmland and Forest Land Assessment Act of 1974 (Act 319- December 19, 1974) was written to provide relief to farmers potentially affected negatively by industrial use spot assessments. The aim was to have agricultural land assessed for taxation purposes on the basis of the use rate then its potential industrial, commercial or residential development. However, for some, the relief provided by the enactment of such legislation was too late. Furthermore, land speculators took advantage of the provisions of an earlier farm abatement act (Act 515) to acquire long-term investments. That is – they took advantage of agricultural and forest land real estate tax abatements until such point they were prepared to take windfall profits by resale of such lands for economic usages other then agriculture. By any standard such shortsighted behavior might be judged to be business wise. Yet it can be considered to be morally compromising. After all, the real public intent of farm tax abatement legislation was and should still be the preservation of farmland, certainly not the legislation of another investment tax shelter. *** *** *** Farmland Protection Tools and Techniques State and local governments have taken the lead in protecting farmland for more than 40 years. All states provide property tax relief for owners of agricultural land and protection from nuisance lawsuits for farmers. Many states have additional programs that are designed to prevent farmland conversion and improve the economic viability of farms. Twenty-one states have authorized purchase of agricultural conservation easement (PACE) programs that offer farmers compensation for giving up the right to develop their land. Sixteen states allow farmers to form special agricultural districts where commercial agriculture is encouraged and protected. Local communities can use comprehensive land use planning and farm-friendly zoning ordinances to control growth in agricultural areas. Some counties and towns also have PACE and other programs to protect farmland, as do the federal government. Some farmland protection tools rely on regulations. The advantage of regulatory strategies is that they can be put in place relatively quickly, and do not require governments to spend a lot of money. But new land use regulations are often controversial, and laws can always be changed--they don't guarantee that farmland will be protected in the long term. Other programs give farmers economic incentives to keep their land in agriculture. These programs are voluntary, and they are usually more popular than regulations. But they may also be more expensive, and they may not be able to protect large blocks of land. Purchase of agricultural conservation easement programs compensates property owners for restricting the future use of their land. PACE is known as Purchase of Development Rights (PDR) in many locations. PACE programs are based on the concept that property owners have a bundle of different rights, including the right to use land, lease, sell and bequeath it, borrow money using it as security, construct buildings on it and mine it, or protect it from development, subject to reasonable local land use regulations. Some or all of these rights can be transferred or sold to another person. When a landowner sells property, generally all the rights are transferred to the buyer. PACE programs enable landowners to separate and sell their right to develop land from their other property rights. The buyer, however, does not acquire the right to build anything on the land, but only the right and responsibility to prevent development. After selling an easement, the landowner retains all other rights of ownership, including the right to farm the land, prevent trespass, sell, bequeath or otherwise transfer the land. Landowners voluntarily sell agricultural conservation easements to a government agency or private conservation organization. The agency or organization usually pays them the difference between the value of the land as restricted and the value of the land for its “highest and best use,” which is generally residential or commercial development. The easement price is established by appraisals or a local easement valuation point system. Typically, PACE programs consider soil quality, threat of development and future agricultural viability when selecting farms for protection. Easements give qualified public agencies and private organizations the right to prohibit land uses and activities that could interfere with present or future agricultural use. Terms may permit the construction of new farm buildings and housing for farm employees and family members. Easements “run with the land,” binding all future owners unless the document establishing the easement provides that the covenant may be terminated for cause or at the end of a specified period of time. HISTORY Suffolk County, N.Y., created the nation’s first PACE program in the mid-1970s. Following Suffolk County’s lead, Maryland and Massachusetts authorized PACE programs in 1977, Connecticut in 1978 and New Hampshire in 1979. Concern about regional food security and the loss of open space were motivating forces behind these early PACE programs. *** *** *** In Lehigh County, George A. Stahl, like Bruce Mordaunt, has voiced concern in regard to the loss of precious farmland and open space in the County. Stahl served as County Commissioner from January 1964 to January 5, 1976 in the County’s three-commissioner old form of government. As County Commissioner at the onset of the proposed Trexler Dam Water Project controversy, Stahl acknowledged that the “Ecology of the region can be destroyed when land is paved and built upon. But ironically, he concluded that the dam would preserve the very thing the public wanted. That is, in the midst of heavy development the recreational lands surrounding Trexler Dam would provide a large permanent oasis of open space. Upon leaving office, Stahl wrote Lehigh County – Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. Of interest, the work was released for public sale one month after the Joint Planning Commission, Lehigh-Northampton Counties (JPC) released its Comprehensive Plan for Lehigh-Northampton Counties. In this 1977 booklet, George A. Stahl suggested the following solutions to state and regional growth problems: “But as the population mounts, voices will be raised to take cropland out of use. To prevent this, some way must be found to distribute population more evenly while reserving the best land for agriculture. To work toward this end, we must first realize that our local zoning boards and Joint Planning Commission are too limited in scope and authority to adopt a comprehensive plan. A better approach would be for Pennsylvania to enact a Land use act similar to that of Hawaii; a State Board could review and coordinate the counties’ concept of land use and would define what areas can be used for agriculture, industry, residences, parks, and open spaces. Without such careful planning, the Northeast will cease to be at all self-reliant in supplying its own food – a great liability should our society revert to small-scale, regional agriculture as some futurists predict.” In this piece we see some evidence that Stahl did not give enthusiastic endorsement to the Comprehensive Plan of the JPC, which we shall soon discuss. That Stahl preferred the land use law as it was applied in Hawaii. And lastly, there is no evidence Whether or not Stahl was familiar with the PACE program as was first initiated in Suffolk County, New York in 1974. But there is some evidence that Stahl might be in favor of the program given his fear that the Northeast would cease to be self-reliant in supplying its own food. *** *** *** To Review PACE once again but more thoroughly: As it occurred, the nation’s first purchase of development rights (PDR) to preserve farmland was initiated in 1974. The Suffolk County Farmland program (New York) has seen 7,000 acres come into the program to date. Land stays in private ownership and the County acquires non-agricultural development rights. These rights are valued as the difference between the full market value of property for its "highest and best use" (full value) minus the value of the agricultural rights (residual value). The owner files property covenants similar to a conservation easement limiting the use of the property to agricultural production FUNCTIONS & PURPOSES PACE compensates landowners for permanently limiting non-agricultural land uses. Selling an easement allows farmers to cash in a percentage of the equity in their land, thus creating a financially competitive alternative to development. Permanent easements prevent development that would effectively foreclose the possibility of farming. Because non-agricultural development on one farm can cause problems for neighboring agricultural operations, PACE may help protect their economic viability as well. Removing the development potential from farmland generally reduces its future market value. This may help facilitate farm transfer to the children of farmers and make the land more affordable to beginning farmers and others who want to buy it for agricultural purposes. The reduction in market value may also reduce property taxes and help prevent them from rising. PACE provides landowners with liquid capital that can enhance the economic viability of individual farming operations and help perpetuate family tenure on the land. For example, the proceeds from selling agricultural conservation easements may be used to reduce debt, expand or modernize farm operations, invest for retirement or settle estates. The reinvestment of PACE funds in equipment, livestock and other farm inputs may also stimulate local agricultural economies. Finally, PACE gives communities a way to share the costs of protecting farmland with landowners. Non-farmers have a stake in the future of agriculture for a variety of reasons, including keeping locally grown food available and maintaining scenic and historic landscapes, open space, watersheds and wildlife habitat. PACE allows them to “buy into” the protection of farming and be assured that they are receiving something of lasting value. ISSUES TO ADDRESS The effectiveness of PACE programs depends on how jurisdictions address several core issues. These issues include: • What kind of farmland to protect, which areas to target and how to set priorities? • What restrictions to put on the use of the land? • How much to pay for easements? • How to raise purchase funds? • How to distribute state funds among local jurisdictions? • How to administer PACE programs? • How to monitor and enforce easements? BENEFITS • PACE protects farmland permanently, while keeping it in private ownership. • Participation in PACE programs is voluntary. • PACE can be implemented by state or local governments, or by private organizations • PACE provides farmers with a financially competitive alternative to development, giving them cash to help address the economic challenges of farming in urban-influenced areas. • PACE programs can protect ecological as well as agricultural resources. • PACE limits the value of agricultural land, which helps to keep it affordable to farmers. • PACE programs involve the non-farming public in farmland protection DRAWBACKS • PACE is expensive. • PACE can rarely protect enough land to eliminate development pressure on unrestricted farms. • PACE programs are generally unable to keep up with farmer demand to sell easements. This results in long waiting lists and missed opportunities to protect land. • Purchasing easements is time-consuming. • The voluntary nature of PACE programs means that some important agricultural lands are not protected. • Monitoring and enforcing easements requires an ongoing investment of time and resources. Source: American Farmland Trust, Saving American Farmland: What Works (Northampton, Mass., 1997). *** *** *** . SUFFOLK COUNTY AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION PLAN as re-stated June 1996 Suffolk County continues to see a rapid decline in farmland acreage despite its longstanding conservation efforts. From 123,000 acres in 1950, the number of farm acres is now reduced to approximately 31,000, only 7,000 of which is protected by easement. At the current rate of conversion and the current rate of development rights acquisition, only 10,000 acres of farms will remain in 2012. To achieve the goal of 20,000 acres of protected farmland, preservation efforts must be accelerated. The goals of the plan are as follows: • Preserve agriculture as an important Suffolk County industry. • Ensure public policy of protecting, promoting and sustaining agriculture. • Preserve farmland as an important natural resource. • Preserve the cultural continuity of farms and farm families. • Preserve 20,000 acres of productive farmland through the purchase of development rights. Suffolk County still leads New York State in market value of crops, two-thirds of which is in nursery and greenhouse products. Because Suffolk County has one- third of all the irrigated farmland in New York State, the farming industry is able to sustain itself in droughts, such as the 1995 growing season. Economically, the farm industry generates 8,000 jobs and contributes a quarter of a billion dollars to the local economy. Upzoning to larger lot sizes over the years has actually been damaging to farm preservation because it is based on a suburban sprawl model of single family detached homes and requires more land, more roads, more uniform development. It has also promoted sterile, cookie-cutter development and discouraged rural, farm-based commercial and industrial development as alternatives to single-family homes. Development pressure on farms has increased, and conflicts between farming practices and rural residential lifestyle has grown with each new residential incursion into farmland blocks. The municipal finance effects of farm conversion are apparent and negative. For every dollar an acre farmland pays in property tax, it uses $0.30 in services. For every dollar an acre a homesite pays, it uses $1.23 in services. Loss of farms, farm jobs, economic activity and favorable property tax ratios to more homes, more traffic and less open space, puts a drain on municipal services and accelerates a decline in the quality of life. Agricultural districts (which allow 8 year property tax reductions) and better mapping of parcels, soils and parcel characteristics are helping decision- makers in the preservation of large blocks of farmland. Future programs for installment purchases, increases in public funding, both locally and on the state and national level for the purchase of development rights and other techniques hold great promise that the goal of preserving 20,000 acres can be met. Improvements in agriculture practices, marketing of produce, community involvement, estate planning, government and institutional support are all helping to support and sustain farming and raise the level of interest in agriculture as an important element in the overall economy of Suffolk County. *** *** *** In reality the Joint Planning Commission, Lehigh-Northampton Counties (JPC) privately agreed with George A. Stahl’s views in regard to the long-range success of its COMPRREHENSIVE PLAN for it publicly acknowledged that the organization’s powers were too limited in scope and authority to force the compliance of regional governmental units or authorities with a comprehensive regional plan. In the midst of the Trexler Dam Water Project debate (1973), Gary E. Scout, Assistant Director of the JPC appealed to environmental groups to cooperate instead of viewing the JPC as an antagonist. He said: “If you all are looking for a government entity that can control growth in the region, you will find exactly none.” In analysis, Stout was relating that regional governmental units such as the boards of the County Commissioners and the JPC had no authority over critical growth policies such as land-use controls and water and sewerage plans. The reason for this is that all public policies that could be brought to bear on growth rates are vested in the profusion or glut of local governments throughout the Lehigh Valley, Because of this fact, the JPC November 1977 COMPRREHENSIVE PLAN, which was essentially an attempt to encourage the cooperation of regional governmental units in seeking solution to established and potential regional problems, was largely ignored by all governmental units including the County Board of Commissioners. Interestingly, an updated version of the original 1977 COMPRREHENSIVE PLAN in 1982 has been similarly ignored as policy by almost every regional unit through the fall of 1984. The lone exception to the general rule was Lehigh County. The Board of Commissioners adopted the JPC land use plan as policy in the fall of 1984. Of course, this policy action of the Board of County Commissioners has given much needed encouragement to the JPC staff and regional planning advocates. JPC officials presently express a hope or a desire that other governmental units in the bi-county planning area would follow the lead or precedent as established by the Board of County Commissioners. *** *** *** Of historical importance, the JPC’s goal has gained the open support of a group known as the Lehigh Valley Partnership (LVP). Organized in 1985, the Lehigh Valley Partnership is a consortium of regional business owners and executives with county and municipal government leaders as ex officio members. The main purpose or interest of the Lehigh Valley Partnership being to instill a regional concern in broadening economic development and to attack problems whose solutions could create ripples of benefits throughout the area. According to Lehigh Valley Partnership spokesman Robert K, Campbell, then President and Chief Executive Officer of the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, speaking at the fourth annual Two Rivers Area Chamber of Commerce business-industry dinner at the Country Club of Northampton County (October 7, 1986) the then stated objectives of the Partnership being: 1. The completion of an extension to Route 33 that would connect Route 33 and Interstate 78. 2. Bring to reality plans for a regional incinerator to handle the bulk of Lehigh Valley’s solid waste disposal. 3. Promote the building of major water and sewer projects. Campbell’s remarks having been made on the twenty-ninth anniversary of Genevieve Blatt’s historic October 7, 1957 visit to the Lehigh Valley in which another P.P. & L Executive Officer, Ralph C. Swartz, played such an important role. Genevieve Blatt was the former Pennsylvania Secretary of Internal Affairs in the Administration of former Pennsylvania Governor George Leader. Thus in 1986 the vested interest of the P.P. & L continued to be the promotion of enhanced urban growth. And if one made a prediction about what vested interest the P.P. & L would have when the 21st century begins on January 1, 2001 one would again conclude that the P.P & L would continue to be an agent of Lehigh County transformation from its historic agricultural roots to that of enhanced urban sprawl. Above and beyond its promotion of its 1986 stated objectives, the Lehigh Valley Partnership did not go away. The fact is, in 1995 the Lehigh Valley Partnership under the leadership of P.P. & L President and C.E.O William Hecht would involve itself in the initiative of creating a private, non-profit corporation known as the Lehigh Valley Economic Development Corporation (LVEDC). The aim of the LVP was to overcome the then prevalent balkanization of regional economic development marketing efforts with the creation of a single regional economic development unit. LVEDC, as a single regional economic development marketing organization, would represent the Lehigh Valley as a whole. Through regionalized marketing and communication initiatives for business retention and attraction, LVEDC would offer businesses and industries one unified source for information about the Lehigh Valley. Then in 1996 the Lehigh Valley Partnership identified and promoted the need for a strategic plan for development of the Lehigh Valley. It formed approximately 17 committees to look at many different quality of life issues in the Valley. While exploring the need to revitalize the region's cities, the LVP concluded that redevelopment of numerous old and abandoned industrial sites was essential. To focus on this issue, the Partnership formed a subcommittee that came to be known as the Brownfields Strategy Task Force ("Task Force"). The first task of the Task Force was to determine the number of brownfields sites in the Lehigh Valley that had the attributes necessary for successful redevelopment. The Task Force identified 72 "Potential Redevelopment Sites" in 25 municipalities. Following many months of work by the Task Force on a number of substantive issues, the Task Force concluded that realizing these opportunities would require an office dedicated to the redevelopment of brownfields. To achieve this end the Task Force created the Lehigh Valley Land Recycling Initiative ("LVLRI"), which began its operations on January 4, 1999. *** *** *** George A. Stahl, not having the advantage of a Lehigh Valley pro-active group in his era such as the Lehigh Valley Partnership, was quick to recognize that regional or even for that fact, state-wide cooperation in the establishment of a comprehensive land use plan would be wanting. For that reason, he presented in his 1977 booklet a case study of Ramapoo, New York. Stahl desperately wanting to present an example for regional government officials and planners of what an industrial municipality might do to control the rate of growth within its boundaries in absence of regional or state-wide controls. Stahl wrote: “If the state does not act, Lehigh County Communities might combat the influx of too many people too quickly much as Ramapo, New York did just thirty minutes from Manhattan, this town more than doubled in population from 1960 to 1968. To meet the threat of over development, Ramapo adopted a strict zoning approach that has been upheld by the courts. Land developers who want to build in Ramapo must obtain a special permit from the Town Board before they can get a building permit. The special permit is not granted unless sewers, drainage, schools, etc. already in the area can accommodate the growth. These public facilities are provided under an 18-year capital budget program. They may also, however, be provided by a builder at his own cost, but a few have gone this route. By upholding quality of life in this way, Ramapoo has brought rampant population growth under firm control. The annual number of new residential units built there has gone from 943 (in 1965) to 200 to 250 for the last four years.” INSTALLMENT THREE Bill 1 – 1973 to prohibit local industries from discharging sudden, massive “slugs” of chemical wastes into the Allentown wastewater treatment system was introduced to the Allentown City Council January 17, 1973 and with amendments passed in final form April 18, 1973. Bill 1 – 1973 having become Ordinance 12003, was the first comprehensive sewerage influent ordinance in the City’s history, superceded and improved upon ten existing laws effecting access to the Allentown wastewater disposal system by city users whether they be residential or industrial. Doubly, its provisions applied to surrounding boroughs and townships and townships and their authorities, which joined the Allentown metropolitan wastewater treatment system by virtue of various agreements made since 1959. The proposed ordinance expediently made available to area industry for comment and review six months prior to its submittal to Council by the Bartholomew Administration. The ordinance developed by the City Operations Department headed by Operations Director George A. Kandra in accordance with state directives based on the Clean Streams Act that required permits and fees for certain discharges, mandated sampling and inspections of flow, and set up controls to handle the disposal of hazardous chemicals and metals. The basis or prime motivation for such legislation being the announced reality that chemicals and metals, particularly those believed to be discharged by textile industries, had been upsetting digesting operations at the Kline’s Island Wastewater Treatment Plant, and accordingly, hampering the performance of the plant and leading to the pollution of the Lehigh River. Naturally, this fixed reality led to conflict between the City and State environmental agencies. As it turned out, the State bore down on the City due to the problem, leaving the City no alternative but to adopt more stringent controls. Copper and chromium, were in fact, the two worst metals the Kline’s Island Plant received. The treatment plant was able to handle the metals when their discharges were spread out, but not in bulk disposal. Accordingly, one of the provisions of the ordinance would be to limit the discharge of chemicals and metals by controlling harmful concentrations. Industries would be required to supply the City with reports of the analysis of their influent and the City, in turn, would provide them with safe disposal allocations. Additionally, the ordinance provided for the monitoring of wastes through laboratory tests by a full-time inspector to tell exactly what the plant was getting, and to pinpoint the industry or industries dumping the waste, In the event any industry couldn’t meet the stipulated requirements, it would be requested to install pretreatment facilities at its own expense, to maintain certain standards. *** *** *** In PART THREE – INSTALLMENT SIX was listed such limitations on the use of the Allentown Sanitary Sewer System and the admission of industrial waste as found in the inter-municipal sewage agreement of 1965. At the same time we compared such limitations with limitations found in the 1959 agreement with Emmaus. But no such comparison was made thus far between the limitations found in the 1965 agreement and those limitations found in the inter-municipal sewerage agreement of 1969. The explanation being, there can be no comparisons made for the limitations agreed to in 1965 were not changed or modified in the 1969 agreement. Clearly, such limitations imposed on the use of the Allentown Sanitary Sewer System and the admission of industrial waste as found in Ordinance 12003 – 1973 were more specific and comprehensive then provisions found in all previous inter-municipal sewerage agreements made since 1959. *** *** *** Simply stated, Ordinance 12003 – 1973 provided that industrial waste of the following strength or character should not be discharged from any improved property into the Allentown Sanitary Sewer System: 1. Industrial waste having a B.O.D. greater then three hundred mg/l; 2. Industrial waste having a content of suspended solids greater then three hundred sixty mg/l; 3. Industrial waste slugs having an average daily flow greater than five percent of the daily sewage flow at the sewage treatment plant of the sewerage system. Additionally, industrial or domestic wastes having the characteristics described below: 1. Having a Temperature higher than 150OF or less than 320. 2. Containing more than 100 milligrams per liter (mg/l) of fat, oil, or grease 3. . Containing any gasoline, benzene, napltha, fuel oil, paint products, acid or other inflammable or explosive liquids, solids or gases. 4. Containing unground garbage, or afflux from mechanical garbage grinders, which does not meet all requirements of the Plumbing Code. 5. Containing but not limited to any ashes, cinders, sand, mud, straw shavings, metal, glass, rags, feathers, tar, plastics, wood, whole blood, paunch, manure, bentonite. Lye, building materials, rubber, hair bones, leather, porcelain, china, ceramic wastes, or solid or viscous substance capable of causing obstruction or other inference with the proper operation of the sewerage system. 6. Having a "pH", stabilized, lower than 6.0 or higher than 9.0 or having any other corrosive or scale-forming property capable of causing damage or hazard to structures, equipment, bacterial action or personnel operating the sewerage facility. 7. Containing a toxic or poisonous substance in sufficient quantity to injure or interfere with any sewage treatment process, to constitute a hazard to humans or animals, or create any hazard in the receiving waters of the sewage treatment Plant. 8. Containing total solids greater than 2,000-PPM or such character and quantity that unusual attention or expense is required to handle such materials in the sewage facility. 9. Containing noxious or malodorous gas or substance, which creates a public nuisance. 10. Containing dye from any source that will not have an effluent the equivalent of that produced by alum coagulation and chlorination to remove suspended or colloidal matter and leach the dissolved dyes. 11. Containing radioactive substances and/or isotopes of such half-life or concentration as may exceed limits in compliance with applicable State or Federal regulations. 12. Having a chlorine demand in excess of 12 mg/l. 13. Prohibited by any permit issued by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 14. Containing wastes , which are not amenable to biological treatment or reduction in existing treatment facilities, specifically non-biodegradable carbon compounds. 15. Containing concentrations of anions, cations, and other various objectionable substances that would make the City responsible for discharging such substances in excess of that amount permitted in the allocated portion of the critical flow of the receiving stream. The maximum allowable concentrations permitted to be discharged from the waste water treatment plant shall be as follows: Substance Maximum Concentrate (Mg/l) Arsenic 0.01 Barium 1.0 Beryllium (as Be) 1.0 Cadmium (as Cd) 0.01 Substance Maximum Concentrate (Mg/l) Chromium (trivalent) 0.5 Chromium (hexavalent) 0.30 Color ( Platinum Cobalt Standard) 100.0 Copper (as Cu) 0.1 Cyanides none Fluorides 2.0 Iron 4.0 Lead 0.05 Mercury none Nickel (as Ni) 2.5 Phenol 0.005 Phosphorous 10.00 Selenium 0.01 Silver 0.05 Tin 1.0 Zinc (as Zn) 0.3 *** *** *** In analysis – the monitoring provisions of Ordinance 12003 would become even more important as design and operational difficulties in the LCA pre-treatment plant located in Upper Macungie, from its service date, prevented efficient pre- treatment of brewery and creamery high strength waste. Thus, it became very possible that industrial waste discharges coming down the 17 mile LCA- Allentown public highway for sewage and wastewater would display characteristics of improper pre-treatment thereby becoming a causal factor that would contribute to possible performance difficulties at Allentown’s Kline’s Island Plant. Of course, with Ordinance 12003-1973, Allentown at least had at its disposal certain legal mechanisms to seek customer compliance with sewage influent regulations. These mechanisms include: • The ability to reject the waste; • The ability to require pre-treatment to an acceptable condition to the public sewers; • The ability to require control over quantities and rates of discharge; and lastly, • The ability to require immediate discontinuance of the waste discharge until such time as it satisfactory meets the required standards as established by said ordinance. Recognizing that certain domestic or suburban users of the Allentown Sanitary Sewer System may respond slowly to comply with the provisions and intent of Ordinance 12003 – 1973, Allentown officials should have understood that the key to compliance rested upon the threat to enforce the Ordinance’s provisions; and of course, enforcement was conditioned upon commitment of those who held the responsibility for upholding Allentown’s inter-governmental wastewater treatment agreements and ordinances. *** *** *** Historically, the LCA operated pre-treatment plant (built in 1971 at a cost of $803,901) closed forever January 27, 1976 after experiencing unsolvable operational difficulties. Seemingly, the closure action by the Authority violated the 1969 Prime Sewage Agreement, which obligated the County to construct and operate or cause to be constructed and operated all necessary pre-treatment facilities, and additionally violated equally binding provisions of Allentown’s Comprehensive Sewage Ordinance of 1973 – Ordinance 12003. But fascinatingly, Joseph S. Daddona, Harry Bisco, Karl Kercher, Watson Skinner , Sam Costa and Benjamin Howells were involved in City of Allentown decision-making that removes the following language from Section 4 (E) of Ordinance 12003, Section 941.04 (e) of the Codified Ordinances of the City: “Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as prohibiting any special Agreement or arrangement between the City and any person whereby industrial waste of unusual strength or character may be admitted into the sewerage system by the City subject to proper continuous pre-treatment prior to discharge into the sewerage system…” The purpose of such removal was to facilitate the decision-making to convert the Lehigh County Authority Pre-treatment Plant to a Chemical Feed Station and to allow for the addition of other Chemical Feed Stations along the Little Lehigh Interceptor in the hope that the sewage would cause no problems in transmission and at the Kline’s Island Plant. Accordingly, Ordinance 12145 ( passed October 15, 1975) produced the following changes in language to Section 941.04 (e) of the Codified Ordinances of the City: “Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as prohibiting any special Agreement or arrangement between the City and any person whereby industrial waste of unusual strength or character may be admitted into the sewerage system by the City subject to payment of a surcharge therefor by such person or by proper and continuous pre-treatment prior to discharge into the sewerage system. The surcharge shall be revised annually, and shall be initially determined by the following formula: Quarterly Surcharge: 0.00834 Q<(BOD –300) $21.39 + (SS –360) $22.23> Where: o.oo834 is a constant to convert waste strength expressed in mg/l of BOD and/or SS to thousands of pounds of BOD and/or SS per million gallons of industrial waste. Q is the quarterly industrial waste from an improved property expressed in million of gallons. BOD is the biochemical oxygen demand of industrial waste in mg/l. SS is the suspended solids of industrial waste in mg/l. 300 and 360 are the allowable waste strengths in mg/l prescribed in this section for biochemical oxygen demand and suspended solids. In order to ascertain the strength of every industrial waste requiring a surcharge, the City shall cause appropriate sampling and analysis to be made four (4) times each year. Said appropriate sampling shall consist of seven (7) twenty-four (24) hour composite samples taken every day for seven (7) consecutive days. Results of each analysis shall be used to establish the surcharge for the particular quarter during which the particular samples is taken and quarterly billing shall be made by the City.” INSTALLMENT FOUR Historically, the Lehigh County Authority operated pre-treatment plant closed forever January 27, 1976 after experiencing unsolvable operational difficulties. The plant’s closure facilitated by provisions in City of Allentown Ordinance 12145 (passed October 15, 1975) that permitted Lehigh County Authority installation and operation of temporary chemical feed stations at he inoperative wastewater pre-treatment plant in Upper Macungie Township, at Keck’s Bridge in Salisbury Township, and at Shrieber’s Bridge in Allentown’s Lehigh Parkway. *** *** *** It being the fixed circumstance of history that decision-making in regard to City of Allentown Ordinance 12145 essentially being the cause of City of Allentown subsidation of industrial waste processing costs for certain industrial clients of the Lehigh County Authority in Western Lehigh County. In addition, it resulted in the largest number of complaints from the public in regard to the presence of malodorous sewage gases in Allentown that until the summer of 1976 had ever been recorded by either the City of Allentown or Environmental Agencies. The epicenter of the recorded 64 citizen complaints apparently located in and around the Lehigh Parkway area. Hence, enactment of purpose, no matter from what reference point its creators impulse of conscience be derived, unfortunately worked to heighten the continuing misery of an already bad situation. *** *** *** Public records indicate that Allentown Mayor Joseph S. Daddona informed the Lehigh County Authority October 13, 1976 (almost a year to the date of the passage of City of Allentown Ordinance 12145) of City of Allentown intent to increase by new ordinance the surcharge it made to the Lehigh County Authority for the processing of untreated industrial waste. The mayor asserting that such action was necessary because the revenue it received from LCA towards the treatment of industrial waste from western Lehigh County was insufficient to offset actual costs. For political reasons, the mayor wanting assurances from the Authority that it would pass the additional surcharges on to those Authority customers most responsible for the large amounts of untreated industrial wastes – Schaefer Brewery and Kraft Creamery. Please note – it also being the fixed circumstance of history, that the two before stated industries had been identified by city officials as being in violation of both effluent quality and quantity limits as established by inter-governmental legal agreements and the City of Allentown Comprehensive Sewage Ordinance 12003 – 1973. *** *** *** But of significance, City of Allentown subsidation of the foreign waste stream that emanated from western Lehigh County continued for the duration of the first Daddona Administration. The fixed reality being that no serious move was formally made to amend the surcharge provisions of Article 941 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Allentown until January 3, 1979. That being the date that Councilmen Benjamin F. Howells Jr and Guy Kratzer introduced Administration sponsored Bill 1 –1979 for first reading to the Allentown City Council as a courtesy to Daddona’s successor --- Frank Fischl. *** *** *** Frank Fischl, a retired Colonel in the United States Air Force, was elected Mayor of Allentown in November 1977 by a very close vote, and formally assumed office January 4, 1978. The January 4, 1978 date also marked the formal end of the first Daddona Administration; and for the first time since January 1966, Joseph S. Daddona had no official status in City Hall. To this day Daddona attributes his loss to his failure to energize his voting base in the 1977 election. Daddona claims that too many loyal democrats elected to sit out the election with the undesirable result for Daddona that the Republican minority was able to win the election. Yet in analysis – the soul and body of the first Daddona Administration wreaked havoc on the Fischl mayoralty. That is, while the soul created the conditions that controlled the agenda of the Fischl Administration, the body worked cunningly to plot the end of the Fischl mayoralty, thus enabling the establishment of Daddona’s second administration in 1982. *** *** *** As it happened Bill 1- 1979 was enacted into law by the Allentown City Council March 21, 1979 becoming Ordinance 12345. The bill on the surface seemingly being the pending legislation that Daddona October 13, 1976 advised the LCA would be brought to City Council for its review and approval. Yet utilization of common sense suggests otherwise. The probable historical explanation for the failure of the mayor to carry out intent or purpose being the following: • The mayor was unable to find adequate support on Council to enact such legislation during his incumbency. (Hard to believe in light of the fact that Daddona had a reliable democratic Council in his first term.) • The mayor preparing for an upcoming re-election campaign, simply was making a “symbolic” public relations gesture knowing full-well that the pending Councilmatic legislation had nothing to do with increased surcharge fees. (Bill 42 – 1976, a.k.a. Ordinance 12250 established a program for senior citizen water and sewer rebates keyed to household income.) • The mayor on the advice of technical experts and legal council elected to pursue other means to force the willingness of LCA to accept additional surcharges and its cooperation fully in abating odors. (On October 13, 1976 Daddona suggested the possibility that the Schaefer and Kraft plants be closed. But at the same time assigned the task to Lehigh County rather then the City. Then too, of more interest, Jack Peek, Allentown Director of Community Development stated that the Pennsylvania Department of Environment Resources had indicated that it could either help close down the two companies or prevent the allocation of any additional sewage treatment capacity to the Lehigh County Authority until such time corrective action was taken or do both.) *** *** *** But whatever the reason for the mayor’s appeared inaction, it can not be denied that industrialization in western Lehigh County, particularly Upper Macungie Township served as a great catalysis to induce City of Allentown air pollution problems and the subsidation dilemma. Allentown City Councilman Benjamin F. Howells Jr. commenting October 13, 1976: “I cannot believe that reasonable men signed such a sweetheart contract and gave everything in this County away.” The above concern making reference to the deal that Lehigh County Commissioners George Stahl, Donald Hoffman and Harley Steward Sr, had made in mid-1969 with F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Company and Kraftco. Then too – a veiled reference in Howells comments that evening being the belief that someone then in power ought to have been charged for misfeasance in office. In reply, Raymond Snyder, General Manager of the Lehigh County Authority, asserting: “ The City should have been more involved with that (contract) in 1969.” In analysis – Snyder’s comments leading us to inquire as to whom held prime responsibility for pressing regional wastewater treatment issues confronting the City of Allentown in 1969. Who let the Dawgs out? The answer must be Joseph S. Daddona. This belief based on a letter dated September 2, 1968 from Arthur L. Wiesenberger of A.L. Wiesenberger Associates to Joseph S. Daddona then serving as a full-time Allentown City Councilman and Director of the City’s Department of Streets and Public Improvements under Allentown’s former Commission government. Daddona, of course, in 1969 had been preoccupied with his campaigns to become Allentown’s first Mayor under the Strong Mayor form of government. First his successful campaign against incumbent mayor Ray Bracy in the spring democratic primary; and lastly, his unsuccessful campaign against former Allen High School Principal Clifford “Chips” Bartholomew in the November General election. *** *** *** Returning our attention to City of Allentown Ordinance 12345, City of Allentown Ordinance 12345 basically changing the Quarterly Surcharge formula from: 0.00834 Q<(BOD –300) $21.39 + (SS –360) $22.23> Where: 0.00834 is a constant to convert waste strength expressed in mg/l of BOD and/or SS to thousands of pounds of BOD and/or SS per million gallons of industrial waste. Q is the quarterly industrial waste from an improved property expressed in million of gallons. BOD is the biochemical oxygen demand of industrial waste in mg/l. SS is the suspended solids of industrial waste in mg/l. 300 and 360 are the allowable waste strengths in mg/l prescribed in this section for biochemical oxygen demand and suspended solids. To: (Ordinance 12345 adding a prohibition against the introduction of Kjeldahl Nitrogen ((a.k.a. Ammonia in nitrogen)) greater than 85 mg/l unless permitted by a surcharge agreement.) 8.34 Q<(BOD –300) $0,085 + (SS –360) $0.076 + (TKN – 85) $0.184 > … Where: 8.34 is a constant to convert waste strength expressed in mg/l of BOD and/or SS and/or TKN into pounds of BOD and/or SS and/or TKN per million gallons of industrial waste. Q is the quarterly industrial waste from an improved property expressed in million of gallons. BOD is the biochemical oxygen demand of industrial waste in mg/l. SS is the suspended solids of industrial waste in mg/l. TKN is the total Kjeldahl nitrogen of the industrial waste in mg/l. 300 and 360 and 85 are the allowable waste strengths in mg/l prescribed in this section for biochemical oxygen demand and suspended solids and total Kjeeldahl nitrogen. But interestingly, the major incentive for the enactment of Ordinance 12345 was the imposition of user charges as required by Federal legislation controlling the 1978-79 expansion of the Kline’s Island Wastewater Treatment Plant: Section four of 12345 providing: “Discharges of any and all wastewater flows to the City Sanitary Sewage System is absolutely contingent on the payment of user charges based on a user charge system in accordance with Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 35.913-13, and Appendix B to Part 35. This requirement is intended as a minimum and does not prohibit the imposition of sewer service charges in excess of federal requirements. The purpose of this limitation on the admission of sewage into the City system is to fulfill Federal requirements and grant conditions associated with the Federal finding of wastewater system improvements.” INSTALLMENT FIVE As the holder of a regional permit to discharge wastewater effluent into the Lehigh River, Allentown had to abide by certain guidelines or risk state or federal environmental agency displeasure. But no such permit was held by Allentown or any Lehigh County community to directly discharge wastewater whether it be treated or untreated into the Little Lehigh Creek. Therefore, Allentown risked state citation whenever its interceptor system surcharged and discharged its contents into the “Conservation Waters” of the Little Lehigh. Allentown might have done well to heed the indirect warning that John D. Durr, Regional Sanitary Engineer, Pennsylvania Sanitary Engineer, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources gave the city when he spoke in West Reading January 28, 1973 to representatives of the Bethlehem based Ecological Protection Society, Trout Unlimited, and the Monocacy and Bushkill Area Watershed Associations. The conservationists were told that in the future developers no longer would be given permits to dump wastes into “Conservation Streams.” Hence permits would require very strict guidelines that 1973 state of art sewage treatment could not meet. This meant that “Conservation Streams” such as the Bushkill, Monocacy and the Little Lehigh would in principle if not practice remain protected until technology developed better waste treatment methods. *** *** *** Allentown Mayor Clifford Bartholomew and members of City Council indeed were notified in correspondence from Durr dated February 20, 1973 for discharges of raw sewage into the Little Lehigh Creek from its Emmaus Interceptor. The discharges generally occurred during and following runoff periods due to the limited capacity of the 30-inch receiving sewer paralleling Lawrence Street, which is now named Martin Luther King Boulevard. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources records indicate a possible maximum flow of approximately 20 million gallons a day from the total of the intercepting sewers along Cedar Creek and Little Lehigh west of Allentown. The existing capacity of Lawrence Street portion of the Little Lehigh Interceptor was less than 8 million gallons per day. These illegal discharges of raw sewage into the Little Lehigh Creek (observed by the Reading PA-DER office February 2, 1973), of course, constituted a violated of the Clean Streams Law of Pennsylvania. However, Durr inferred the issue of greater importance was the concern that the Allentown water works intake was located immediately downstream from the discharges. And, he added that the same discharges constituted a violation of a permit dated May 4, 1960 and bearing number 9606, with special condition “A” stated: “When the area tributary to the Emmaus Interceptor has developed to the point that the flow from this existing interceptor renders imminent the overloading of the existing 30” City of Allentown Little Lehigh Interceptor, a relief line must be constructed. The plans for the relief sewer must be submitted to the Sanitary Water Board for approval before construction.” Consequently, Durr issued an order that required the City to stop the illegal overflows of raw sewage from the Little Lehigh Interceptor. In this order he maintained that the sewer under consideration seemed to reflect two conditions, namely: 1) excessive infiltration along its entire length of ground water and/or the presence of surface water inlets since the condition occurred during an following precipitation runoff and, 2) the near total use of sewers capacity during the non-precipitation period because of the rapid occurrence of sewer overflow at times of precipitation. And importantly, this order directed the City to submit within thirty days of receipt of the Durr communication a report of the steps that would be taken to investigate the causes of the problems together with the dates these studies were to be started and completed. Allentown Director of Operations George A. Kandra, the responsible city official to implement the Durr directive, did not deny the state official’s concerns although the correspondence included an order for Allentown to take immediate action to stop the overflows. In a letter dated March 20, 1973 to Durr, Kandra wrote: “We concur that the periodic overflow you refer to exists. It was recognized in 1970 that deficiencies were apparent in this area.” Nevertheless, Kandra also wanted to inform Durr of Allentown’s efforts to resolve the problem prior to the issuance of the February 20, 1973 citation. We note – in decision-making Kandra could avail himself of two Metcalf & Eddy reports releases in 1969. Metcalf & Eddy in its “Report to the City of Allentown, Pennsylvania on 1965-66 Trunk Sewer Gaging --- July 2, 1969 “had indicated that Section 1 and 2 of the Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer (also known as the Little Lehigh Interceptor) would need relief at full development. This was especially true of Section 2, as the expected peak flows in 1990 would exceed 1969 capacity by more then 50 percent. Of course, the peak flows beyond 1969 capacity would require a 30- inch relief line running from the junction of the Little Lehigh Creek Collection Sewer (also known as the Emmaus Interceptor) and the Little Lehigh Creek Trunk Sewer, Section 2, to the twin 24-inch pipe river crossing at the upper end of the Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer, Section 1, a distance of some 5,350 feet. But Metcalf & Eddy considered it premature to recommend (at that time) relief activity for the lower portion of the Little Lehigh Creek Trunk Sewer, Section 1. Then too – Metcalf & Eddy in its “Feasibility Report to the City of Allentown, Pennsylvania on Additional Waste Treatment Facilities at Kline’s Island – December 8, 1969 “ did not overlook the possible problems connected with the discharge of wastewater from the Lehigh County Authority. It reasoned: “ Allentown’s principal interceptors would have had sufficient capacity to handle wastewater from the city and the presently connected townships and boroughs for the design period, However, with the proposed discharge of wastewater from the Lehigh County Authority, relief interceptors may be required for certain reaches of the Emmaus and Little Lehigh Interceptors in the future.” The question we derive from the above passage is that at what point would Allentown decision-makers determine that relief interceptors would be required for certain reaches of the Emmaus and Little Lehigh Interceptors? We note – Metcalf & Eddy did address the issue in its 1966 released reports. But at the same time, we find cross-reference or comparison of these reports made difficult by use of different titles or identification for interceptions. For example, the Metcalf & Eddy reference to Lower-1 Little Lehigh Interceptor in the December 1969 study corresponds with reference to the Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer, Section 2 in the July, 1969 study and of course, Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer, Section 1 in July, 1969 study is referred to as Little Lehigh Interceptor Lower-2 in the December 1969 study. (See FIGURE FOUR) Fundamentally the key to determining when an interceptor needs to be relieved is having knowledge of the absolute size and capacity of that line. And also, having knowledge as to the Volume (measured in cubic feet per second) of peak flows that enter such lines. Therefore, in its December, 1969 report Metcalf & Eddy recommended to the city that gauging on the Lower-1 section of the Little Lehigh Interceptor should be started on a periodic basis in 1970 so that information would be available in the future to judge when this sewer would have to be relieved. And additionally, it advised that the peak flows in the 24- inch section of the Emmaus Interceptor (that is, the Keck’s Bridge area) and the Lower-2 Section of the Little Lehigh Interceptor should be closely observed and gauged periodically to determine when these sections would require relief. Metcalf & Eddy (December, 1969) figures indicate that capacity flow in the Lower-1 Section of the Little Lehigh Interceptor as being 15.4 c.f.s and respectively, capacity flows in the 24-inch section of the Emmaus Interceptor and the Lower-2 Section of the Little Lehigh Interceptor as being 12.2 and 26.45 c.f.s. In regard to the 24-inch Emmaus Interceptor we further note an additional limitation in capacity by virtue of the December 22, 1969 Allentown-Lehigh County Authority Sewage Agreement. That is, the City of Allentown granted to the Lehigh County Authority the perpetual right to convey sewage and wastes into the Allentown system in an amount not to exceed 10 cubic feet per second (an equivalent of 6.5 million gallons per day.) The exception being that the 10 c.f. s could be exceeded by 20 percent for a period of two hours per day no more than one day per week. (A situation when combined with inflow/infiltration would virtually assure line surcharge.) Then too, it was Metcalf & Eddy’s recommendation that plans and specifications be prepared for the Lower 1 Section of the Little Lehigh Interceptor relief Sewer as soon as annual gauging indicated that the sewer was going to be surcharged. In this way construction of this relief sewer could proceed as soon as the capacity of the existing interceptor was exceeded. The design and construction of the relief sewers for the 24-inch Emmaus Interceptor and the Lower 2 Section of the Little Lehigh Interceptor according to Metcalf & Eddy should be delayed until it had been determined when or even if the expected peaks would occur. In analysis, these Metcalf & Eddy advanced warnings of the future necessity for the City to provide relief to its Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer from the Shrieber’s Bridge to Fountain Park (as well as other locations) as legitimate upstream peak sewage flows increased was taken in account by responsible officials of the newly established Bartholomew Administration. Kandra reported in a March 20, 1973 letter to Durr that it was determined that by 1975 the before said relief sewer would have to be installed predicated on evidence of 1970 current conditions and projected flows for the following six years. Consequently, the project (estimated cost being $292,000) was listed in the city’s six year capital improvements program with work scheduled to begin in 1975. Of course, from our vantage point in the future we note that no such relief line was constructed on a permanent basis from the junction of the Emmaus and Little Lehigh Interceptors (a location more commonly known as Shrieber’s Bridge area) to the twin 44-inch pipe river crossing located in Fountain Park within visual view of the vintage spare parts and manufacturing facilities of Mack Trucks Inc. The fact is short-range solutions were applied to buy more time and delay the moment of truth. *** *** *** Of particular interest in regard to inflow/infiltration, Metcalf & Eddy’s 1965-66 gauging study indicated that infiltration was not a serious problem. We quote from the 1965-66 “Gaging” report: “The observed heavy flows from the storm water are not caused by excessive infiltration, as formerly believed, but are due primarily to roof drain connections and needed repairs on some trunks,” In regard to anticipated extensions of the existing sewerage system, Metcalf & Eddy believed that such extensions should be constructed of concrete and vitrified clay pipe having rubber-gasket joints. They reason that rubber gasket joints are more easily made tight, and thus admit less groundwater than the poured or mortar joints used in most of the then existing system. Therefore, Metcalf & Eddy concluded that carefully constructed extensions to the system could not increase infiltration appreciably. Consequently, lower allowance for such infiltration on a per capita basis would be justified in the design of future extensions. We ask – Did theory as presented by Metcalf & Eddy in its 1965-66 “Gaging Study” translate into fact. Clearly, if theory became fact, why then was it necessary for John P. Durr to issue a citation to Allentown February 20, 1973 for illegal overflows into the Little Lehigh Creek? We note – Kandra revealed in his March 20, 1973 correspondence to Durr that a 1971-72 Gaging Study by Metcalf & Eddy determined that average maximum flows within the LCA-Allentown public highway for sewerage increased by approximately 100%, and average minimum flows increased 50% over the 1965- 66 readings. Kandra could not contribute this total increase solely to new customers. Therefore, speaking for the administration, he admitted that storm water was a major fact in interceptor surcharging. For the record, Metcalf & Eddy was authorized to study and submit a feasibility report that would indicate an estimate of the capabilities of the various trunk and interceptor sewers in the city as one facet of a more comprehensive service agreement signed August 20, 1970 between the Allentown Authority and the Boston firm. The Allentown was requested to enter into the before stated service agreement with Metcalf & Eddy by City Council Resolution No. 23222 adopted December 16, 1969. Interestingly – Joseph S. Daddona was both City Councilman and lame-duck Director of the city Department of Streets and Public Improvements at the time of the city council vote. George Kandra with the establishment of the new form of government was appointed by “Chips” Bartholomew to take over Daddona’s administrative duties. Then too (in regard to LCA’s interceptor construction program) Daddona, perhaps, had too much faith in the ability of LCA to install connecting interceptors that would be watertight enough to reduce the percent of infiltration of storm water and groundwater in the lines. Therefore, he was party to a decision that did not allow much allowance for said infiltration during peak periods of peak flows. The result being, where bottlenecks existed in the Allentown system, with any amount of heavy or extended rainfall the lines became surcharged. And historically, as the LCA system developed toward full potential this surcharge condition became visible for longer durations. *** *** *** Faced with a major storm water infiltration problem, Kandra had to determine whether the problem was domestic (that is- confined to causes within the city) or foreign (that is- confined to causes outside the city). The Metcalf & Eddy 1971- 72 gauging study did not change plans for the installation of a relief line, but showed the necessity for the city to initiate a program for the elimination of storm water as well. Kandra in correspondence with Durr revealed that city council budgeted a sum of $180,000 as “seed money” to make a start on the elimination of storm water into the sanitary sewer systems. Then too, bids were received January 15, 1973 for the purchase of a TV seal unit for this purpose. The unit was delivered the latter part of February 1973. Four additional people were hired and after one week of schooling, men and equipment started a planned sequence of work. But the problem was more pervasive and was impacted by external influences. As evidenced by a full flowing pipe (29”) during peak periods (and with a state citation in hand) Kandra decided it was time for the city to begin work on the construction of a relief line before 1975. However, the Operations Director realizing that with a pipe flowing one half full during morning hours, and surcharging during rainy spells there was evidence of substantial storm water infiltration. Thus, Kandra felt the need to address both problems. To accomplish this end, Kandra had no alternative but to inform John Durr March 20, 1973 that he intended to pursue the following course of action: • First –he would notify the Lehigh County Authority, Salisbury and South Whitehall Townships by April 1, 1973 that the City required for its own use a portion of the Little Lehigh Interceptor {a 1.2-mile line along the Little Lehigh Creek, from Shrieber’s Bridge to Fountain Park}. And then, he put the same entities on notice that they must construct a relief line running from Shrieber’s Bridge to Fountain Park for their own use by April 1, 1974. {Authorization for such action being found in Section 2D of both the 1965 and 1969 Sewage Agreement}. • Second – approximately forty-two miles of city interceptor lines would be inspected and sealed. • Third – he would formally notify Emmaus, Salisbury, South Whitehall and the Lehigh County by April 1, 1973 of their obligations to eliminate storm water infiltration within their respective sewer systems. And would demand that a timetable of action must be submitted to the city within ninety days, {Authorization for such action found not only in the 1965 and 1969 sewerage agreements but also in the 1959 agreement as well.} Interestingly, Kandra’s April 1, 1974 deadline passed with divergent views as to whether infiltration into the Cit of Allentown sanitary sewer system attributable to sources west of Allentown had been corrected sufficiently to warrant the lifting of what in effect had been a ban or moratorium on sanitary sewer hook- ups to the city’s trunk lines. John P. Durr, Regional Sanitary Engineer, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, in a March 25, 1974 response to a progress report written by outgoing City of Allentown Operations Director George A, Kandra commented: “After several meetings and exchanges of correspondence, you have advised by your letter of March 22, 1974, of significant accomplishments in the reduction of inflow/infiltration and the plans for additional reductions by early summer of 1974, with the exception of that associated with the City’s extensive sewer system. It would appear now that the surcharging condition has been brought under control.” On the one hand, this was not the opinion of Allentown City Councilman Benjamin F. Howells Jr. or Allentown Mayor Joseph S. Daddona. Both maintained April 17,1974 that the manhole cover on the interceptor in the Little Lehigh Creek near Cedar Creek had overflowed during “recent rainstorms,” indicating that the water infiltration problems were not yet solved. Daddona, in fact, wrote to Durr that it would be a “grave mistake” to release the moratorium on the sewer connections until the infiltration of water was substantially reduced or until the city’s proposed Lawrence Street relief line was completed. But John Durr did not believe that a “grave mistake” had been made when he commented in the same March 25, 1974 letter that: “By practicing diligence in sewer construction, continuing to eliminate inflow/infiltration and care in issuing building permits, it is believe the existing facilities can function within the several Department permits until the relief intercepting sewer is constructed as well as the proposed additions to the City’ s sewage treatment plant.” Kandra in his March 22. 1974 letter to Durr had indicated that based on survey findings and actual repair work completed, the interceptor line in the vicinity of Shrieber’s Bridge had been relieved. He maintained that approximately 500,000 gallons per day of clear water had been eliminated from the system in question and, that a proposed new interceptor relief line approximately 6,000 feet in length had been designed by the Lehigh County Authority and submitted to DER on February 28, 1974. The submission had been made along with an application for Federal grant funding under PL 92-500. But the fixed reality would occur that the proposed line would not receive federal funding. The fixed reality being the case with or without a program of construction that would produce a completed interceptor in time for resumption of building construction during the summer of 1974 and in advance of the federal grant award. Interestingly, Raymond H. Snyder, General Manager for water and wastewater of the Lehigh County Authority in a January 31, 1974 letter to representatives of municipalities tributary to the Little Lehigh Inceptor sewer said: “A schedule which would produce a completed interceptor in time for resumption of building construction during the summer of 1974 would require contract letting prior to the processing by Department of Environmental Resources of a fund grant request. To do so would presumably make the project ineligible for financial assistance.” Clearly we can derive the following assumption from the before said Snyder statement. Indeed this is hard evidence that the LCA would not let contracts for any required relief line construction until sought after federal funding was received; then too, the communities impacted by Kandra’s April 1, 1973 order took a pragmatic view (that is, they demonstrated a lack of willingness to expend local user fees or local tax resources on the project) and this approach guaranteed that the then current environmental problem would in actuality remain unsolved. The consequence being that a problem was extended which had continued to remain an active concern of citizen groups and state regulatory agencies as the mid-1980’s arrived. In analysis, with the Kline’s Island Wastewater Treatment Plant re-rated by DER from a hydraulic capacity of 28.5 mgd to a hydraulic capacity of about 31 or 32.5 mgd based upon new design data gathered by the City and its sewerage consultant Metcalf & Eddy, and the related problem at Shrieber’s Bridge suddenly determined by DER to be relieved to its satisfaction on paper, homebuilders and industrial development people awaited the expected lifting of an implied but never officially mandated moratorium on new construction in western Lehigh County. Surely, the communities west of Allentown by this turn of events no longer had the incentive to act immediately. Rather, the incentive was provided for these same communities to await the next crisis in order to take action. More specifically, prior to the expansion of the Allentown Wastewater Treatment Plant to 40.0 mgd hydraulic capacity as called for by a 1969 agreement and after the DER re-rating of Allentown Wastewater Treatment Plant hydraulic capacity, the flow limits of the communities tributary to the Kline’s Island Plant stood as follows: City of Allentown 23.6 mgd Lehigh County Authority 4.0 mgd South Whitehall 2.5 mgd Coplay-Whitehall 2.3 mgd Salisbury 1.2 mgd Borough of Emmaus 1.4 mgd Total 31.0 mgd *** *** *** The before mentioned controversy just one of many political and environmental problems or confrontations that has occurred between the City and those suburban communities that tied their futures to Allentown’s city owned-and operated sewer lines and wastewater treatment plant since 1959. Remarkably, the unresolved nature of these controversies have given unexpected aid and comfort to those who oppose the complete transformation of the Lehigh County landscape from its historic base of being largely rural and agricultural to that which is widely urban in characteristic. Why? The unresolved nature of the continuing city-suburban controversies has unwittingly slowed the growth of sewer related residential and industrial development in suburban areas. INSTALLMENT SIX As shown in FIGURE FIVE, the upper reaches of the Lehigh County Authority wastewater collection system extend into the Upper and Lower Macungie Townships. Beginning in this area, the interceptor systems conveys wastewater toward Meter Station Number 5 located near Keck’s Bridge in Salisbury Township. Immediately following Meter Station No. 5 the Authority’s interceptor system connects to the Emmaus Interceptor, which extends from this area to its downstream confluence with the Cedar Creek Interceptor (more commonly known as the Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer – Upper or the Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer – Section 3). The Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer – Section Two (also known as the Little Lehigh Trunk Sewer – Lower 1) begins at this confluence point and serves as the final conveyance step in the transport of wastewater to the City of Allentown Wastewater Treatment Plant at Kline’s Island. *** *** *** In previous INSTALLMENTS we have already alluded to the difficulties in reaching political settlements to the issue. But from an engineering standpoint the problem with the interceptor, which runs parallel to the Little Lehigh Creek, is at least understandable. The 36-inch Emmaus Interceptor and the 27-inch Cedar Creek Interceptor discharge their combined waste loads into the 30-inch Little Lehigh Interceptor. The result producing a pressure induced restriction and the increased probability of the discharge of raw sewage into the Little Lehigh Creek – a cold water stream and an important raw water source for Allentown. But we note – engineering problems related to interlocking systems cannot be unraveled unless regional politicians reach a mutually beneficial agreement. And, of course, that fixed reality ought to be considered a great achievement considering the many varied interests, and considering the fact, that in our times men (or for that fact women) tend to love nothing but money and self. John Durr, Regional Sanitary Engineer, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources in a letter dated May 2, 1973 to George A. Kandra, Allentown Director of Operations commented: “The meeting held in the City building on April 16, 1973, with representatives of the surrounding municipalities appears to have raised more questions than problems solved. I have requested to male all types of explanations for bans on sewer connections by builders and residents in the suburban municipalities. At the meeting on April 16, 1973, someone whom I cannot now identify made reference to several dates, which would be applicable to a connection ban. I had not addressed myself to a ban in any previous communication; however, if these municipalities were willing to impose a ban, I was agreeable because it improves very definitely the chance of reducing surcharging conditions. The dates that were mentioned, I presumed, might have been in correspondence not originated by me.” But in subsequent discussions with many persons pertaining to the so-called ban, Durr indicated that each municipality had an obligation to control infiltration; and these obligations were clearly stated in the Standard Conditions that were issued with each sewerage permit. The following Standard Conditions were included on all sewage permits issued prior to September 1972: 1. No storm water from pavements, areaways, roofs, or other sources shall be admitted to the sanitary waters herein approved, which shall be used exclusively as carriers of domestic sewage and suitable industrial wastes. Storm water shall be admitted only to such sewers as are specifically approved for use as combined sewers. (Conditions Six) (Note – the City of Easton was the only municipality in the Allentown-Bethlehem- Easton Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area that had in part a combined sewer system. It comprising less then 10% of the city and was located in the old downtown section where a large amount of urban renewal projects had been undertaken. As a part of this renewal program, when the combined sewers had to be relocated, they would be eliminated with the construction of separate sanitary and storm sewers.) 2. If at any time the sewerage system of the permittee or any part thereof, or the discharge of sewage therefrom shall have created a public nuisance, or such discharge is or may become inimical and injurious to the public health or to animal or aquatic life or to the use of receiving water or domestic or industrial consumption, or for recreation, the permittee shall forthwith adopt such remedial measures as the Sanitary Water Board may advise or approve. (Condition Fourteen) The following Standard Conditions included on all sewerage permits issued after September 1972: 1. No storm water from pavements, areaways, roofs, and foundation drains or other sources shall be admitted to the sanitary sewers herein approved. (Condition Five) 2. If at any time the sewerage facilities of the permittee, or any part thereof, or the discharge of the effluent therefrom, shall have created a public nuisance, or such discharge is causing or contributing to pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth, the permittee shall forthwith adopt such remedial measures as are acceptable to the Department. (Condition Twelve) In further comment to Kandra, Durr inferred that his office initiated no ban on house connections. Whatismore, the sanitary engineer did not anticipate that a house connection ban would be initiated so long as surcharging conditions were brought under control. However, he warned that if such movement toward achieving control had not been accomplished within the intent of item 3 of Kandra’s letter dated March 20, 1973, then a ban would be initiated. A total ban, of course, would require a total cessation of all new connections in the affected area. *** *** *** Durr had hoped that after the April 16, 1973 meeting the entities impacted by Kandra’s April 1, 1973 pronouncement would attack the problem in a spirit of cooperation and good will. But alas, the April 1, 1974 deadline for providing relief to the often time surcharged Little Lehigh Interceptor passed with a muddled situation toward ultimately resolving the issue. The fact being that prior to the deadline there were voices that questioned whether the deadline could be met. One such voice rose being that of William G. Malkames who opinioned that the April 1, 1974 target date for completion of relief work was no longer realistic in light of the fact that as of December 13, 1973 the County had not yet let a contract for necessary engineering studies. Being as George A. Kandra had left the post of Allentown Director of Operations with the appointment of Harry Bisco, it was left to Harry Bisco (whose tenure in Allentown began April 15, 1974 near the beginning of the first Daddona Administration) to grapple with the unresolved issue of eliminating the discharge of raw sewage into the Little Lehigh Creek by action of providing relief to the LCA-Allentown public highway for sewage in Allentown’s Lehigh Parkway. The task proved to be difficult and complex for the Lehigh County Authority simply ignored the problem and devoted all their tine and attention to justifying their inaction as being the consequence of the lack of the availability of federal dollars to pay for the required relief interceptor. The above actually was the position of Allentown Mayor Frank Fischl and City Council President Benjamin F. Howells Jr. in a public statement issued September 25, 1979. Historically there is validity in the Fischl and Howells comments of September 25, 1979. During the course of an October 24, 1973 meeting attended by legal, engineering, and other representatives from Allentown, Lehigh County Authority, Salisbury and South Whitehall Townships and their authorities, it was generally agreed that the Allentown Authority would act as financing agent for the 1.2 mile long sewer line within Allentown’s Lehigh Parkway to be used by the before mentioned suburban entities for the transmission of raw sewage to Allentown’s Kline’s Island Wastewater Treatment Plant. Metcalf & Eddy, Allentown’s consulting engineer, had determined that the cost of providing relief to the Little Lehigh Interceptor would be $300,000 with design engineering fees, including topographical studies adding another $20,000 to $25,000 to the project. But the Allentown Authority by resolution dated November 14, 1973 declined to undertake the design and construction of the before said 1.2 mile long interceptor. Interestingly, the Allentown Authority recommended that the Lehigh County Authority, Salisbury and South Whitehall Townships employ Metcalf & Eddy to design the before mentioned interceptor, The before said suggestion of the Allentown Authority receiving the approval of the Salisbury Township Board of Commissioners late in 1973 as evidenced by a communication dated December 28, 1973 from James G. Kellar, Salisbury Township Solicitor to Chester S. Dutton, Chairman of the Lehigh County Authority. But in his communication, Kellar offered a new element to the design issue. He offered: “Choice of a design engineer, of course, is only one small part of the over-all situation. It would seem to me that no intelligent decisions can be made until we have in hand the report of Malcolm Pirnie, Inc. Our respective engineers will need to study this report so that we can intelligently come to some decisions. Until these decisions are made, it will not be known what the design engineers are to design. And, of course, various other decisions must be made in order to permit preparation of the necessary agreements between the parties.” Nevertheless, late in 1973 the Lehigh County Authority directed its engineer, A. L. Wiesenberger Associates to proceed “immediately” with preparation of specifications for the project. We note – by February 7, 1974 the estimated cost of a parallel sanitary sewer line along the Little Lehigh Creek from Shrieber’s Bridge to Fountain Park had risen $150,000 to a total cost of $500,000. And of importance, by February 28, 1974, engineering design, in form suitable for review by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, was submitted to that agency, in time to meet the March 1, 1974 Federal application for funding under PL 92-500. Thereafter, A.L. Wiesenberger Associates proceeded to finalize design details, in order to get plans in condition for presentation to the interested municipalities for review and comment. At that point the Lehigh County Authority would expect to meet with representatives of each affected municipality in order to reconcile any problem involving design and achieve agreement in regard to a cost-sharing plan. According to Raymond H. Snyder, General Manage of the Lehigh County Authority, in an April 30, 1974 communication to municipalities tributary to the Shrieber’s Bridge intercepting sewer, it did not seem appropriate to ask the parties to convene until the LCA had the final design and estimated project costs that could then be translated into cost sharing figures. Then too, Snyder observed in the same April 30, 1974 letter: “As we have told officials of both Allentown and Department of Environmental Resources, of course, a considerable amount of infiltration/inflow work was under contract or otherwise committed, but not yet physically accomplished, as our 19 March letter to those officials. It is essential that this work move along on schedule. Otherwise we may expect Allentown officials to take action to protect their water quality.” Unfortunately, difficulties related to obtaining federal assistance forced serious delays in the resolution of the problem for the Lehigh county Authority and the suburban municipalities to Allentown’s frustration demonstrated a lack of willingness to expend local user or tax resources for the project. And additionally, the situation became more complex when Malcolm Pirnie, Inc, of White Plains, New York, retained by the Lehigh County Authority to perform a variety of services related to the development of a countywide sewerage system, released a report that included comment in regard to the before said mentioned parallel interceptor. *** *** *** Also, It is our continuing concern that resolution of the problem would be predicated upon the suburban municipalities determining their place in the undefined future. Indeed they did not want their growth activities limited or thwarted by the fixed reality of the ultimate capacity of the City of Allentown wastewater treatment systems and by political cunning sanctioned by Ordinance and contract agreements. After all, they reasoned, economic activity in the suburban areas would keep the Lehigh Valley a growth area throughout the rest of the twentieth century and beyond – at least that was their hope In 1973 – the Lehigh County Authority retained the services of Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., Consulting Environmental Engineers to develop a comprehensive wastewater management plan for Lehigh County for purposes of maintaining acceptable water quality in local streams that will be or have been impacted to future year detriment by past, present and future growth activities. This would be accomplished by the eventual construction of appropriate water pollution control facilities. Among the immediate concerns that confronted Malcolm Pirnie in 1973 were: • The need to improve the processing of high strength industrial waste at the LCA’s pre-treatment plant located in Upper Macungie; • The need to reduce or eliminate groundwater and storm water infiltration into the LCA Interceptors; and • The need to provide relief to prevent periodic overflow conditions of the City of Allentown’s Little Lehigh Interceptor. And of course, Malcolm Pirnie’s expertise in regard to these was reflected in its “Summary Report to Lehigh County Authority, Lehigh County on Water Pollution Control Facilities – September 1974.” In regard to existing wastewater treatment facilities, Malcolm Pirnie maintained the following in its report: “The existing wastewater treatment collection and treatment facilities within the County include a system of regional interceptors and trunk sewers terminating at the existing Allentown Wastewater Treatment Plant on Kline (sic) Island and two smaller wastewater collection and treatment systems on the Lehigh River at Catasauqua and Slatington. The capacity of the Allentown plant will be 40 mgd upon completion of a current expansion program. Hydraulic studies by Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., Consulting Engineers for Allentown, have indicated that process- piping sizes limit any further expansion of the existing Allentown plant. Therefore, a separate new facility will be required.” The Catasauqua and Slatington plants can be modified to meet stream standards and expanded to provide the 2.5 mgd and 0.8 mgd flow capacities, respectively, which are estimated for those services areas in 1995. Like the Kline (sic) Island site at Allentown, the Catasauqua plant could become a regional wastewater treatment site by the addition of a new plant. The Slatington site, however, is too remote from central Lehigh County to be used as a regional site.” The separate new regional facility for wastewater processing in addition to Catasauqua alluded to above by Malcolm Pirnie would be located in the Riverside Industrial Park Tract in Salisbury Township. Malcolm Pirnie determined that the tract of land met all of the environmental and physical criteria established for new treatment plant sites in Lehigh County. That is: Size and shape of site; Topography of site; Proximity to development; Potential for flooding; Accessibility for construction and operation of maintenance functions; Foundation conditions; Environmental conditions; and Receiving stream discharge criteria. Whatismore – Malcolm Pirnie maintained that the Riverside tract was the only tract of sufficient size to support the additional advanced wastewater treatment facilities that would ultimately be needed in the future in Central Lehigh County. TABLE VIII defines the recommended service areas plant locations, and treatment capacities of the “required” wastewater treatment facilities for Central Lehigh County. TABLE VIII RECOMMENDED TREATMENT FACILITIES AND SERVICE AREAS LOCATION TREATMENT FACILITY SERVICE AREA Catasauqua 2.5 mgd sub-regional plant Catasauqua, North Catasauqua And Hanover Allentown 40 mgd regional plant Allentown, Salisbury Township, Emmaus and portions of the Cedar Creek drainage basins Salisbury (Riverside) 15 mgd regional plant Western Lehigh County and Portions of northern central Lehigh County where flows Exceed the capacity of the Allentown plant Malcolm Pirnie in its 1974 report addressed the issue of adequate capacity of existing regional interceptors and force mains. It related: “A system of regional interceptors currently exists in Lehigh County. Some of these facilities, however, are now being used to capacity and, in some cases, in excess of capacity resulting in periodic overflows to adjacent streams.” Malcolm Pirnie then recommended that the following measures be taken to alleviate the problem: “The first phase construction program will provide an express pipeline from western Lehigh County to the vicinity of Kline (sic) Island to relieve the already overloaded Little Lehigh Creek Interceptor through Allentown. It also will provide a pumping station and force main from the area adjacent to Kline (sic) Island to the Riverside plant site. A connection with the Allentown plant will provide added reliability to the system because each plant will be able to act as standby for the other in case of temporary plant upset. Later phases of construction will reinforce existing facilities to the north and est of the Little Lehigh Creek pipeline.” *** *** *** Of course, what Malcolm Pirnie proposed would have an economic cost. And the fatal flaw in the proposal would be that the Lehigh County Authority would not finance the cost unless it was able to receive a sufficient level of federal and state funding. The estimated construction costs for the recommended project, which included pipelines, pumping facilities, and wastewater treatment facilities, were based on preliminary design data for the wastewater treatment facilities. The United States Engineering News Record (USENR) Construction Cost Index was used for developing construction costs trends. The total and net local project costs for the facilities included in the first phase of the recommended plan are shown in TABLE IX. Malcolm Pirnie estimates included allowances for technical services, legal and financial costs, and for construction contingencies. Also, it reflected an anticipated 75 percent federal grant for eligible construction costs. TABLE IX ESTIMATED CONSTRUCTION AND PROJECTS COST FIRST PHASE OF LEHIGH COUNTY AUTHORITY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM USENR = 2800 FOR TREATMENT PLANT USE USENR = 2600 FOR ALL OTHER FACILITIES Description of Facilities Area Served Estimated Cost Little Lehigh Creek Interceptor Portions of Upper and Keck’s Bridge to Lehigh River, Lower Macungie, Alburtis, 48”, 6.3 miles Macungie, and Upper Milford $ 5,000,000 Lehigh River Pumping Station All of above and North Central Lehigh County $ 3,500,000 Lehigh River Force Main 30” All of the above and North Sewer, 2.3 miles central Lehigh County $ 1,200.000 Subtotal – Construction costs of pipelines and Pumping Station $ 9,700,000 Riverside Treatment Plant Western and North Central 15 mgd capacity Lehigh County $24,800.00 Total - Construction Costs $34,500,000 Contingency and Technical Services $ 6,900,000 Subtotal – Eligible Construction Costs $41,400,000 Federal Aid at 75% of Eligible Construction Costs $31,100,000 Subtotal ---- Local Project Cost $10,300,000 Estimated land, Rights of way, legal costs and conversion of Pretreatment Plant to Chemical Feed Station $ 1,500,000 Financing Costs Interest during Construction $ 1,000,000 Bonding Costs Including Reserve Funds $ 1,800,000 Net local Project Costs $14,600,000 Figure Six *** *** *** In final analysis, comprehensive examination of the 1974 Malcolm Pirnie document offers us a key to understand the fixed reality of ongoing political and environmental battles that have occurred during the past decade. Of interest, the Malcolm Pirnie document plain and simple is a blue print for continued economic development – that is, a blue print for continued growth activities in western Lehigh County. The document also was a plan that would promote or foster an enhanced degree of urbanization in Lehigh County. Malcolm Pirnie presented its own analysis of the merits of its own recommended plan in the following statement: “The recommended plan combines economy of scale for treatment works with an integrated system for utilization of existing interceptor capacity and an environmentally sound plan for future wastewater management in the Study Area. It is, first of all, cost effective relative to any other alternatives that may be considered. Second, staffing of a single new treatment plant will likely present fewer problems than for two or more new plants. Third, the selection of the Riverside site over the Kline (sic) Island site provide flexibility for future process changes or additions at Kline (sic) Island, better utilization of the assimilative capacity of the Lehigh River, and generally lower treatment requirements. Finally, the new facilities at the Riverside site will be designed to accommodate the special BOD5 and suspended solids wastewater characteristics and loadings produced by the existing industry in the western part of the County. Therefore, the existing pretreatment plant in Trexlertown will be converted to a chemical feeding station for the purpose of providing for chemical addition to the County wastewater en route to the new facilities.” Allentown officials, quite certainly, were not philosophically opposed to the concept of enhanced urbanization of Lehigh County. Just the same, Allentown officials, seeking to protect their long-standing financial investment in the Kline’ s Island Wastewater Treatment Plant and administration position in regard to the network of sewers and treatment facilities within Lehigh County, sought from its engineering consultant, Metcalf & Eddy, viable alternatives to counter the program advanced by the County. Metcalf & Eddy’s response being found in Report to Allentown Authority, Allentown, Pennsylvania on Additional Wastewater Treatment Facilities on Kline’ s Island --- November 18, 1977. The Report suggesting the following alternatives in the administration of sewer and wastewater treatment facilities within Lehigh County: “There are two prime alternatives in the administration of the sewer and treatment facilities within Lehigh County. First, total administrative capabilities can be assumed by one management organization. Second, facility administration can be split between two or more organizations, with a division of operational and billing responsibilities. The visibility of each mode of administration will also be affected by whether or not each administration utilizes agreements as a definitive tool to divide responsibilities among the signatories, and whether or not communities serviced by these facilities will be split between to treatment plant sites. An assessment of the existing agreements should first be made, with subsequent analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of facility administration by one or tow administrative organizations.” Importantly, this subsequent analysis of the disadvantages and disadvantages of facility administration by one or two administrative organizations can be extracted from the Executive Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations contained within the same report. Please note – One Metcalf & Eddy conclusion being the following: “… A comparison was made of the costs associated with construction, operation and maintenance of plant expansion at Kline’s Island with the costs developed in the September 1974 Malcolm Pirnie report for plant expansion at the Riverside Industrial Park site and adjusted to current dollars. Construction costs should be about equal. Operation and Maintenance costs, on the other hand, should be considerably lower for the Kline’s Island site.” The above conclusion resulting in the following recommendation: “… Since the Kline’s Island land site will be most cost-effective for location of additional treatment capacity, there appears to be no inherent advantages to removing or replacing the Allentown Authority as the managing organization responsible for operating and financing wastewater treatment facilities for Lehigh County communities tributary to Kline’s Island.” Having made its professional opinion very clear, Metcalf & Eddy in its 1977 Report proceeded to detail a project program that contemplated the additional expansion of the Allentown Wastewater Treatment Plant from its anticipated 40 mgd hydraulic rating after the present expansion to 70 mgd hydraulic rating sometime around the year 2016. This proposed expansion to be accomplished in increments of three 10 mgd expansion phases. But interestingly, the Allentown Authority’s position as the managing organization responsible for operating and financing wastewater treatment facilities for and Lehigh County communities tributary to Kline’s Island did change. This change seemingly indicated in a letter dated November 18, 1977 to then Mayor Joseph S. Daddona from Charles Y. Hitchcock, Jr., Senior Vice President for Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. that accompanied the engineering firms report. The historical record was that the City of Allentown for whatever motive and long-range purpose had reassumed financial liability for sewer and wastewater treatment debts March 15, 1977. The City of Allentown having sold ownership rights to the wastewater treatment plant and accessory carriers and interceptor systems by formal agreement with the Allentown Authority dated May 1, 1960. But by leaseback it retained rights to function as operator and manager of the wastewater treatment plant and its accessory carriers and interceptor systems. As stated by City Councilman Watson Skinner Jr, March 2, 1977, this formal reversal in city policy was based on economics. Skinner claiming that the twin impact of reduced interest rates on the refinanced bond issue and the elimination of the requirement to set aside twenty per cent of annual debt payments would save $918,000 over the next twenty-nine years. In analysis of Skinner’s statement, longtime City Controller Louis Hershman informs us that under then existing state and federal laws and regulations that the Authority operated, it had to maintain a twenty per cent escrow account above and beyond its contracted debts or liabilities. This escrow account according to Hershman was not required of the City under then applicable state and federal laws and regulations. On the surface, at least, one can reasonably conclude that the prime motivation for the Administration’s sponsored initiative to regain for the City of Allentown ownership of the Kline’s Island Wastewater Treatment Plant and accessory carriers and interceptor systems as being economic. But in the long-range additional motivation can be postulated considering the new directions of regional economics and political adventurism. The point is Skinner also implied March 2, 1977 that the City’s Administrative Department would have recommended this transfer even if no dollar savings were involved. That the Administrative Department actually wanted an immediacy in decision-making for Mayor Daddona and Leo Fetzer, the Business Manager of the City of Allentown, in attacking the difficult sewage issue. Of material import, in 1977 Daddona faced a tough re-election challenge. (Please note – the Joint Planning Commission of Lehigh-Northampton Counties, interestingly, revealed March 2, 1977 a plan to set aside 3.7 million gallons of future sewage capacity at Allentown’s Kline’s Island Wastewater Treatment Plant for industrial and commercial growth. The plan proposes “pooling” that amount, rather than allocating it to the individual municipalities linked to the Kline’s Island Plant. The plan being developed in wake of an Allentown proposed tax-base sharing system, whereby all signatories would gain a part of the new tax generated by industrial and commercial growth. The advantages of a tax-base sharing system being the following: • It is said to reduce competition among jurisdictions for commercial and industrial development. That is, each member community within a region shares in the benefits of commercial-industrial growth. • There is said to be a reduction for the need to make land decisions purely on economic grounds. That is, other considerations, such as environmental impact, could be given increased weight in the decision-making process. Then too, the disadvantages of a tax-base sharing system being the following: • It would appear that under Pennsylvania law a strict application of the formula is impossible. That is, industrial-commercial property cannot be taxed at two different rates by a municipality. • There appears to be no legislative mandate to compel local governments to cooperate in a tax-base sharing plan. Indeed we ask – Was Allentown, whose public position has always been stated that the City of Allentown should remain the managing organization for operating and financing wastewater treatment facilities for Lehigh County communities tributary to Kline’s Island, prepared to bargain for the sell out of its system and its responsibility to either private industry, the Lehigh County Authority or a new created county wide regional authority? Then too, we ask – Did Joe Daddona, Sam Costa, Dennis Cramsey, Watson Skinner, Alton Frey Jr., Benjamin F. Howells Jr., Bob Lang, Karl Kercher, Leon Hontz and Thelma Barnes serve as facilitators to advance this long-range objective? Importantly, in the short-range, the elimination of the Allentown Authority’s mandate in regard to wastewater treatment matters streamlined the cast of characters responsible to state Allentown’s position during negotiations for a long-term sewerage solution with Allentown’s sewer district signatories. The implication being, the approval of the Allentown Authority was no longer required for ratification of any long-term sewerage pact with Allentown’s Sewer district signatories. The net effect being that the City Administration would have a freer hand to deal directly with difficult regional issues. Important too, if Allentown Mayor, if Allentown Mayor Joseph S. Daddona had any long-range plan for settlement of regional economic and developmental issues, this plan was either taken over, reshaped, put on hold or derailed with his defeat in the 1977 Mayoral election by Republican Frank Fischl. As it occurred in March, 1979, it would be the responsibility of Frank Fischl not Joseph S. Daddona to deal with Lehigh County Executive David K. Bausch in order to prepare the groundwork to settle outstanding economic and fiscal problems between the County, City and outlaying municipalities. This initiative would lead to the formation of the Allentown-Lehigh County Greater Community Council. The Council’s prime purpose was “to develop a constructive, realistic and implementable solution” to several regional issues. Please note – the most complex and perplexing was the regional sewage problem. A problem related to signatory disputes over sewage treatment capacity and the future provision of treatment facilities when needed. It being the stated intent of the Allentown --- Lehigh County Greater Community Council ( Co-chaired by Dexter F. Baker, President, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. and Robert K. Campbell, President, Pennsylvania Power & Light Company) that it create an analytical database that officials from the City of Allentown, County of Lehigh and Allentown Sewer District Signatories could refer to during negotiation stage of regional sewage problem resolution. This analytical database can be found in its report entitled Sewage Task Force Report --- Analysis of the Issues and Recommendations --- November 1980. The Council report made the following recommendations of regional historical importance: 1. A regional authority should be created through the “buyout” of the Allentown Sewage Treatment Plant and all intercepting sewers then owned by Allentown and suburban municipalities. Collection systems should remain the responsibility of local municipalities. 2. Acquisition of above systems would be accomplished through a “wash” arrangement. The regional authority would then assume all outstanding debt and pay back through an current value credit all equity which each municipality then held in the system. 3. A regional economic development policy based on the Joint Planning Commission’s 1977 Comprehensive Plan would then be implemented to match industrial and commercial growth to available sewerage capacity. 4. A portion of the available capacity at the Allentown Sewage Treatment Plant would then be allocated to an industrial and commercial pool to facilitate the attraction of new industries. 5. Capital projects should be undertaken to increase the capacity of the Allentown Sewage Treatment Plant to treat biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and suspended solids (S/S), and to reduce the inflow/infiltration in sewage system. Historically, the City of Allentown, County of Lehigh, the Coplay-Whitehall Sewer Authority, the Lehigh County Authority, the Township of Salisbury and the Township of South Whitehall reached accommodation in regard to sewage treatment capacity and other outstanding issues in December 1981 near the end of the Fischl Administration. As stated in the agreement’s preamble “the City is, and at all times, was the legal titleholder and operator of a sewage and wastewater treatment plant.” Thus the debate over sew plant equity ended with a regional agreement that formally characterized the County of Lehigh and the other signatories as customers of the City,” who purchase and will purchase a service, which is the transmission of their wastewater discharge from the City limits to the City treatment plant” for purposes of treatment of this wastewater. Prior to the regional agreement, treatment capacity in the Allentown Treatment Plant was subject to one limitation, namely Hydraulic Flow. After the regional agreement, treatment capacity in the Allentown Treatment Plant became subject to two limitations, namely Hydraulic Flow and Allowable Loadings. By agreement, no party to the agreement would be able to exceed its Hydraulic Flow limit or it Allowable Loadings limit. The term “Hydraulic Flow” refers to the volume or amount of wastewater discharged by a signatory for treatment at the Treatment Plant. More specifically, prior to the December 1981 regional agreement Hydraulic Flow limits of the signatories were as follows: City of Allentown 28.2 mgd * Lehigh County Authority 4.5 mgd South Whitehall 2.0 mgd Coplay-Whitehall 2.3 mgd Salisbury 1.6 mgd Borough of Emmaus 1.4 mgd _______ Total 40.0 mgd • Allentown figures includes 0.5 mgd of allocation committed to South Whitehall. After the December 1981 regional agreement Hydraulic Flow limits of the signatories stand as follows: City of Allentown 23.05 mgd * Lehigh County Authority 6.15 mgd South Whitehall 2.00 mgd Coplay-Whitehall 3.42 mgd Salisbury 1.98 mgd Borough of Emmaus 1.40 mgd _______ Total 40.0 mgd • Allentown figures includes 0.5 mgd of allocation committed to South Whitehall. • Environmental Reserve includes 0.25 of Allentown allocation committed to South Whitehall. Importantly, within the context of the 1981 agreement, the signatories of the regional agreement, acknowledged publicly that the operation of the Treatment Plant and the City’s Interceptor Sewers have created environmental problems in the form of odors, excessive stockpiling of sludge, organic overloading and overflows from the Interceptor sewers. Consequently, the pact mandates that the signatories agree to the following conditions: 1. That the signatories use their best efforts to work cooperatively in solving said problems; 2. That the suburban municipalities agree to assist the City in obtaining sites to dispose of sludge with the cost thereof shared as set forth in the pact: 3. That the suburban municipalities neither initiate nor support efforts to prevent disposal of sludge on any site approved by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources; 4. That when said environmental problems are solved to the satisfaction of the Mayor of Allentown “in accordance with reasonable objective standards,” an additional 2.0 mgd treatment capacity held in Environmental Reserve for Future Allocation would be distributed and allocated as follows: City of Allentown 1.35 mgd * Lehigh County Authority 0.34 mgd Coplay-Whitehall 0.20 mgd Salisbury 0.11 mgd • Please note --- 0.25 of Allentown’s reserve allocation actually belongs to South Whitehall Township “ when and at such time “ the Township demonstrates “ a desire or need for additional Hydraulic Flow capacity. The term “Allowable Loadings” refers to the characteristics of wastewater discharged by any signatory with respect to three specific characteristics, namely, 5-day Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Suspended Solids (“S/S”) and Total Kjeldahl Nitrogen (“TKN”). More specifically, the design capacity of Allentown’s Kline’s Island Wastewater Treatment Plant with respect of said three items is: BOD 210 mg/l S/S 230 mg/l TKN 40 mg/l Which means based upon the Hydraulic Flow allocations of each of the signatories and the stated design capacities of the Kline’s Island Plant, the Allowable Loadings of each of the signatories is stipulated as follows: ALLOWABLE LOADINGS PRIOR TO DISTRIBUTION OF 2.0 ENVIRONMENTAL RESERVES Hydraulic Flow Allowable loadings (lbs per day) Party Allocation MGD BOD S/S TKN City of Allentown* 23.05 40,370 44,215 7,690 Lehigh County Authority 6.15 10,771 11,797 2,051 South Whitehall 2.0 3,503 3,836 667 Coplay-Whitehall 3.12 5,465 5,985 1,041 Coplay-Whitehall (LV Dairy)** 0.30 525 575 100 Salisbury 1.98 3,468 3,798 661 Emmaus 1.4 2,452 2,685 467 Environmental Reserves 2.0 3,503 3,836 667 Total 40.0 70,057 76,727 13,344 * Includes loadings attributable to 0.5 mgd committed to South Whitehall. ** The Lehigh Dairy, formerly a customer of the City, exceeded these loading limits in 1981. Any loadings above these limits were deemed to be loadings of the City. ALLOWABLE LOADINGS AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF 2.0 ENVIRONMENTAL RESERVES Hydraulic Flow Allowable loadings (lbs per day) Party Allocation MGD BOD S/S TKN City of Allentown* 24.40 42,734 46,804 8,140 Lehigh County Authority 6.49 11,364 12,405 2,165 South Whitehall 2.0 3,503 3,836 667 Coplay-Whitehall 3.32 5,815 6,365 1,108 Coplay-Whitehall (LV Dairy)** 0.30 525 575 100 Salisbury 2.09 3,661 4,009 697 Emmaus 1.4 2,452 2,685 467 Total 40.0 70,057 76,727 13,344 * Includes loadings attributable to 0.75mgd committed to South Whitehall. ** The Lehigh Dairy, formerly a customer of the City, exceeded these loading limits in 1981. Any loadings above these limits were deemed to be loadings of the City. And finally, the 1981 agreement recognized that the loading in the wastewater then being discharged by the Lehigh County Authority exceed the County Authority’s stated allowable loadings because of the absence of pretreatment of certain industrial wastes, namely creamery and brewery wastes. Therefore, Lehigh County agreed that within five years from the date of the agreement” it will provide, or cause to be provided, such pretreatment as to bring the County Authority within the limits of its Allowable Loadings, or cause to be provided, an alternate solution to said overloading problem which is acceptable to the City and which does not reduce or infringe upon the rights of the other parties with respect to Hydraulic Flow allocation and/or Allowable Loadings under the agreement.” Of interest, during the stated five-year period, the Lehigh County Authority (LCA) did have the right to continue to exceed its allowable Loadings upon payment of the proper charges for treatment of the over-strength wastewater so discharged. But it did not have the right during the same period to allow any new or additional discharges of wastewater in aggregate exceeding 2,890 pounds per day of BOD, 3,165 pounds per day of S/S, or 550 pounds per day TKN. As it happened, the County’s new pretreatment plant was not in line by December 1986 as stipulated in the agreement. Hence it was up to Joseph S. Daddona who succeeded Frank Fischl in 1982 as Allentown Mayor to deal with County delays in meeting its contractual commitments and also to determine when the before stated environmental problems were resolved “in accordance with reasonable, objective standards” to allow the release of the promised additional allocation to the signatories. Then too, there remained for Daddona’s attention issues, differences or disputes that remained unsettled between the City and the other parties to the 1981 agreement, namely: 1. The establishment of a regional sewer agency of some type to possibly own and operate the Treatment Plant, to plan and build any future treatment plants as they may be needed, to own and operate major interceptors and to own and operate all of the collection systems themselves; 2. The amount of any additional future capacity which may be required by the various parties to the 1981 agreement; 3. Storm water run-off controls and programs to minimize and prevent downstream flooding problems; and 4. The regional benefits of tax base sharing and transfer of financial responsibility for City services and facilities to the County for purpose of cost effectiveness and equity. (P.S. --- Concerning Point One, when all this was happening we worried that the Lehigh County Authority which started out as a water authority and which built the disasterous Wiesenberger Pre-treatment plant would be given the responsibility of serving as a regional sewer agency in any future agreement.) INSTALLMENT SEVEN We note – the proposed Riverside Plant did not become fact in the last seventies; and, it has not become fact as we enter the twenty-first century. Yet the concept was not completely forgotten in the 80’s and 90’s by those who had a vested interest in promoting the creation of a new metropolis west of Allentown. In fact, at a meeting not open to the public held February 1, 1985, James M. Montgomery, Inc. Engineering Consultant for Lehigh County, briefed Terry Schutten, Lehigh County Administrator, Rob Fulton, Lehigh County Director of Human Services, Jim Creedon, Lehigh County Director of Planning and Development and Lehigh County Commissioners John Brosious and John Yurconic in regard to various options for Lehigh County’s proposed construction of a new sewage plant. Simply put, the following main proposals with variations or refinements were presented to the participants attending the secret sessions: 1. A large-scale full treatment plant near Fogelsville for industrial and domestic users; 2. A pre-treatment plant which could be converted to a full treatment plant; 3. A facility which could be strictly pre-treatment to satisfy the County’s obligations to Stroh brewery; and 4. A full treatment plant for all users at the Riverside Industrial Park in Salisbury Township. Of interest is Point Four, for here we see the rebirth or reactivation of the Riverside Industrial Park Sewage Treatment Plant idea. We emphasize that the infrastructure to be created will not exactly be duplicate of what Malcolm Pirnie suggested in its 1974 blueprint for action but it would be similar, In otherwords the directors have tinkered with the general plot as outlined by the author but overall the plot will be generally the same. This Phoenix-like reappearance of the concept of Riverside or new boldness to promote growth activities becomes even more obvious with knowledge that the Lehigh County Authority November, 1984 has updated Malcolm Pirnie’s July, 1974 plans to provide “relief “ to the Allentown/Emmaus Interceptor from Keck’s Bridge to the Jefferson Street Lehigh County Authority Park Pumping Station with the installation of a large 42”/48” diameter Gravity Flow interceptor. Coincidentally, the 1974 Malcolm Pirnie Report proposed a 48” diameter line leading from Keck’s Bridge to the vicinity of Basin Street which would be connected with a 30 mgd Pumping Station and 30” diameter force main leading to the Riverside Industrial Park Sewage Treatment Plant. A 42” diameter line leading from the Lehigh County Authority Service Area would connect to the Keck Bridge 48” diameter line. But interestingly, LCA’s existing infrastructure within Allentown’s municipal boundaries completed December 1983 (that is, a 16 mgd capacity LCA Park Pumping Station with accompanying 24”, 30” and 36” diameter Force Mains leading from the Jefferson Street area to the Little Lehigh Interceptor at the confluence of the Little Lehigh and Trout Creek) was never suggested in the original Malcolm Pirnie proposal. We ask – Why then were the LCA Park Pumping Station and the accompanying Jefferson Street Force Mains built? We respond – It was the expedient end result of events that started with Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources Regional Sanitary Engineer John P. Durr’s message to Allentown Director of Operations George A. Kandra February 20, 1973. The term expedient being the correct term to use because industrial development loan agencies, developers, and township planners did not want their activities in western Lehigh County handicapped by temporary or permanent bans on sewage connections to the Allentown wastewater treatment plant. Then too- it was for the purpose of obtaining continued access to contract allocated reserve capacity in the Allentown plant that developers agreed to fund construction costs for the temporary LCA above ground relief line running from Shrieber’s Bridge to the vicinity of Fountain Park that visitors to Allentown’s Lehigh Parkway have termed in a non affectionate way the “Green Monster.” But in analysis, the design and environmental conditions that necessitated the relief of the Little Lehigh Interceptor at Shrieber’s Bridge were not solved by the construction of the “Green Monster” or by its successor the LCA Park Pumping Station – Jefferson Street Force Main Water Control Construction Project. Why? These projects did nothing to resolve the inflow/infiltration problems of the LCA infrastructure outside the boundaries of Allentown; and more important, the peak flow surcharge condition as evident at Shrieber’s Bridge was only transferred upstream to the Keck’s Bridge area. *** *** *** But professional we realize our research would be devalued and incomplete if we ignored or overlooked the following historical summarization as provided by George L. Parks, Regional Water Quality Manager, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources in relationship to restrictions placed on western Lehigh County sewer extensions into the Allentown wastewater treatment system resultant from problems associated with the Little Lehigh Interceptor. This historical summarization found in a communication written February 12, 1982 by George L. Parks and delivered by certified mail to the Presidents of the Lower Macungie Township Sewage Authority and the Salisbury Township Board of Commissioners. Thus, from his perspective, Mr. Parks writes: “ On Ma 29, 1979, I wrote to the parties and municipalities shown on the attached sheet briefly explaining the problems and proposed solutions to the Little Lehigh Interceptor which is tributary to the Allentown Sewage Treatment Plant. In my letter, I expressed concern with allowing uncontrolled sewer extensions being connected to the Little Lehigh Interceptor. I stated that we would allow connections to be made and that they totaled approximately nine hundred (900) equivalent dwelling units, we would reassess the capacity of the existing lines and make determination whether or not to allow continued connections to be made to the Little Lehigh Interceptor. Please note – historically a reassessment of Little Lehigh Interceptor Capacity having been made September 30, 1981 and November 11, 1981. Consequently Parks relying on this data presents the following observation in his February 12, 1982 communications: “On September 30, 1981, and November 11, 1981, with the assistance of the City of Allentown, we conducted surveys of the Little Lehigh Interceptor to determine whether or not to allow additional sewer connections to be made to this line. The temporary relief line appears to be successful; the permanent relief line is currently under construction and should be in service in approximately one and one-half years, and there visibly appears to be a modicum of capacity left in the Little Lehigh Interceptor.” The implication of this observation was that the Department of Environmental Resources would lift all environmental restrictions to western Lehigh County sewer restrictions. Leaving in place only those restrictions based on contractual obligations and responsibilities. Thus, Parks concludes his February 12, 1981 communication with the following emphasis: “ The above reasons coupled with no problems being reported during the nearly three-year period has caused us now to allow additional connections to be made to the Little Lehigh Interceptor and its tributary lines. These connections shall not exceed the remaining capacity of the interceptor and shall be monitored jointly by the Lehigh County Authority and the City of Allentown. If problems do occur with the Little Lehigh Interceptor, the Lehigh County Authority and the City of Allentown shall cause immediate corrective action to be taken.” SUMMATION Looking back into history, it is amazing that in 1974 Malcolm Pirnie estimated the total cost of constructing a completely new sewage treatment network complementing the Allentown system would be $41.4 million. Of course, as evidenced by the Lehigh County Board of Commissioners December 1984 approval of a $48 million bond issue in preparation for decision-making in regard to various options involving full or partial treatment of wastes in the LCA service area, the cost would be much larger. It becoming public knowledge that Lehigh County prior to making its final decision never had serious intent of providing a full-scale wastewater treatment plant in Upper Macungie. That, a pre- treatment plant, with additional design capacity would be built to serve planned Stroh Brewery production increases and existing operations at Kraft Foods. Lehigh County having become by a 1981 agreement with Allentown to replace its defunct pre-treatment facility in Upper Macungie with some type of pre- treatment capacity. The option still left the door for the future construction of the Riverside Industrial Park Wastewater Treatment Plant in Salisbury Township. Allowing justification for speculation that in the interim the public would be prepared for such eventuality by the manipulation of events and the continuation and transference of existing environmental problems. Importantly, Malcolm Pirnie was contracted by LCA to update existing flow estimates for and estimate hydraulic capacity of the Allentown/Emmaus Interceptor, review the magnitude and frequency of overflows which had been occurring in the Keck’s Bridge area, and estimate maximum infiltration and inflow rates. In July 198, Malcolm Pirnie completed its study and presented its finding entitle Report on Allentown/Emmaus Interceptor to the Lehigh County Authority. The report examined several methods, which would increase the capacity of the Allentown/Emmaus Interceptor, effectively eliminating the sewage overflows into the Little Lehigh Creek and allow for the future expansion anticipated in the western portion of the county. A preferred alternative was presented and after review by the LCA and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, the decision was made to proceed with design bases upon the preferred alternative, consisting of a 36-inch diameter dual decked gravity/force main utilizing the original sewer trench. The managers of LCA received the necessary approval of the Allentown City Council August 15, 1984 for their preferred alternative and withstood a September 5, 1984 effort to rescind the said approval. But the results of a soil test pit program (conducted to determine the type of soil to be excavated, the depth of ground water and most importantly, the condition and prevalence of rock along the proposed course of the new interceptor) created the possibility of additional alternatives that would be more cost effective than the preferred alternative identified in the July 1984 report. Thus, Malcolm Pirnie released its Updated Report on the Allentown/Emmaus Interceptor November 1984. And, of course, we find it extremely fascinating that the new preferred alternative called for the step-by-step upgrading of capacity of the LCA Park Pumping Station to 40mgd. Then too, this alternative would require that approximately 2,000 feet of 30” diameter force main be constructed from the Park Pumping Station to the upstream end of the existing 36” diameter section of the Little Lehigh Relief Force Main. In analysis – we viewed the new proposed alternative as a means to bring the existing LCA infrastructure within Allentown in line as much as possible with the original 1974 Malcolm Pirnie blueprint to service Riverside. And also, we did not suspect that discharge conditions within the Little Lehigh Interceptor would disappear as the result of the construction of the new relief line. Why? We didn’t believe that the inflow and infiltration problems would be answered upstream from LCA’s Number Five Metering Station. Also, the Little Lehigh, Jordan Creek, Trout Creek, Front Street – Union Street Interceptors would converge to cause overflow problems in the Basin Street area. And, of course, recognizing that the worst case scenario and with study of the 1974 Malcolm Pirnie document we concluded as early as August 198 that public events could be manipulate to foster the need to construct a new interceptor to the Riverside Industrial site in Salisbury Township. With that, the setting might be set for the phoenix-like emergence of the Riverside Industrial Park Wastewater Treatment Plant on the banks of the Lehigh River, A project that a local newspaper reporter said would not come into being at an early date because of its expense. But the evidence in the mid-eighties became more convincing that planning would begin due to the following interrelated sequence of events. 1. An announcement by cash strapped Bethlehem Steel Corporation that it would be willing to sell a tract of land in Salisbury Township known as the Riverside Industrial Park: 2. The quick response in January 1986 by Aurel Ardnt, the new General Manager of the Lehigh County Authority (LCA) upon the retirement of Raymond Snyder, that the LCA was willing to develop the Riverside Park in Salisbury Township as a wastewater treatment facility to service the future growth need of Lehigh County. Even so, another ingredient into this mix provided another alternative. Advocates for the Preservation of South Mountain worked very hard to preserve the natural beauty of South Mountain by seeking to purchase large chunks of its terrain and protect it from development. One of these groups, the Wildlands Conservancy, founded in 1973, is dedicated to preserving precious land, keeping waterways healthy, teaching the community about nature and caring for injured or orphaned wildlife. Wildlands Conservancy is membership supported and its programs are accomplished largely through volunteer efforts. Located at the 72-acre Pool Wildlife Sanctuary in Emmaus, the Conservancy has helped protect over 31,000 acres in Eastern Pennsylvania *** *** *** In any case, we did emphasize that in the mid-eighties the scenario we discussed in regard to the phoenix-like emergence of the Riverside Industrial Wastewater Treatment Plant would not necessarily come unto being overnight or the immediate future. But we knew that the idea was out of the box and lurking for the right moment to catch us by surprise. The fact was, the Lehigh County Authority in order to implement its long-range plan had to arrange for its financing, and this project would prove to be difficult given the uncertainty of federal, state and private funds then available. The fact being, David Bausch, Lehigh County Executive, as early as February 5, 1985 (on the surface) had set aside options relating to the construction of a Riverside Wastewater Treatment Plant and a full scale wastewater treatment plant near Trexlertown. Bausch electing to pursue the construction of a $32 million pre-treatment plant near Trexlertown possessing the capability to be expanded to service what the Executive termed “moderate growth” needs in the western part of Lehigh County. The first decision, of course, had been made by the Board of Commissioners who also were given the option to expend $24 to $27 million for a basic pre-treatment operations serving only contracted clients like Stroh Brewery and Kraft Foods but possessing no capability to be expanded. Of course, liability wise, the latter option was all that was required of the County to meet its 1969 contractual obligations to Stroh Brewery and Kraft Foods; and also; to meet the requirements of the City of Allentown – Signatory Sewerage Agreement of 1981. Please note – historically, it was announced August 12, 1986 that the County Executive of Lehigh County, David Bausch had agreed to increase the design capacity of the County’s proposed pre-treatment plant to meet projected production increases by the Stroh Brewery in Upper Macungie Township. The agreement when implemented would pave the way for construction activities to begin in spring of 1987 with completion scheduled in 1991. By agreement, the County paid any capital costs that accrued under $25 million for pre-treatment plant construction and engineering costs related to initial pre-treatment design. Then too, the County would additionally be expected to finance any costs accrued over $40 million. The brewery expected to pay all capital costs accrued above $25 million but under $40 million for necessary construction expenditures and an estimated $1.3 million for re-engineering costs relating to the design of the plant. *** *** *** In the end we must stress, whether Riverside ever becomes a fixed reality depends upon future battles between those who favor unbridled growth and those who wish to halt the transformation of the Lehigh County from its historical agricultural and rural base to that of urban sprawl. It also expected that given their resources that Lehigh University and AT & T Technologies would play a key role in Lehigh Valley future economic development. A.T & T Technologies would in time be spun off from its parent to become a part of Lucent Technologies and in time the Microelectronic Division of Lucent in Allentown and the Lehigh Valley would be spun off to form the new corporation Agere Systems. *** *** *** Important too, this process could also be impacted by what might become a counter balancing trend of industrial abandonment by older Lehigh Valley industries as exhibited by the announcement of Mack Trucks, Inc. January 22, 1986. In analysis, it was revealed that officials for Mack Trucks, Inc. and economic development personnel for the State of South Carolina were in contact for fourteen months to work out the deal that was announced January 22, 1986 to the regret of those individuals employed by Mack Trucks, Inc. and to of “responsible” local, state and federal officials in the Allentown-Lehigh Valley region of Pennsylvania. It was our understanding at the time that as part of the package, Mack would be granted an earning credit amounting to $500 per job created at the soon to be built state-of-the-art (that is robotic) Winnsboro, South Carolina plant. It was announced that an estimated 1,000 new jobs would be created in South Carolina and that South Carolina would assist in the training of resident South Carolinians to fill these positions. Unfortunately 1,800 jobs were lost in the Allentown-Lehigh Valley region of Pennsylvania and nobody in South Carolina (especially Governor Riley) talked about giving reparations to those individuals the actions of the South Carolina government have destroyed. And, since officials in that South Carolina community had additionally hoped to attract suppliers of parts to the new Mack plant in Winnsboro, South Carolina, we must add the 1,150 Mack jobs already lost in 1984 to the reparations list as well. Indeed it would be interesting to learn whether the good people of South Carolina made the first contact with Mack officials. If this were the case, then the government of South Carolina has involved itself in economic warfare against the Allentown-Lehigh Valley region of Pennsylvania. A shock to the Allentown- Lehigh Valley region of Pennsylvania that will ring as a “Day of Infamy” achieving the emotional level of a “Pearl Harbor” or a “Fort Sumpter.” We ask – How can any government unit in the United States justify the use of “Corporate Welfarism” tactics to harm directly or indirectly another governmental unit of the United States? But the truth is, this is done regularly on the State and local level in the name of industrial development and leads to the financial enrichment of certain individuals in one community to the detriment of individuals in other communities. We would be angrier at this occurrence of Peter robbing Paul, except that the masterminds of growth in the Allentown-Lehigh Valley region have made their own raids on other economies as well. Indeed they have fell victim to the siren lure of what industrial development programs may offer primarily in the short- range for a community. In the year 2001 some of the agents in promoting economic development programs in the Lehigh Valley are: The Lehigh Valley Convention & Visitors Bureau, The Lehigh Valley Economic Development Corporation, The Lehigh Valley Industrial Park, The Lehigh Valley Planning Commission, The Northampton County Development Corp, The Pennsylvania Economic Development Association. The fixed reality being that South Carolinian Governor Riley’s comments to Mack Truck President John Curcio January 22, 1986 at the University of South Carolina brought back remembrances of a supposedly happier day in the Allentown-Lehigh Valley region of Pennsylvania when then Governor Ray Schafer of Pennsylvania made similar welcoming remarks to a new corporate citizen, F & M Schaefer Brewing Company of New York City. The day was December 8, 1970, and upon completion of a scheduled cornerstone –laying ceremony on-site for the $60-million Schaefer Brewery, Rudolph J. Schaefer III thanked a group of 200 Lehigh Valley leaders at a noon luncheon at the Lehigh County Country Club for accepting his company both as a resident and property owner in the Lehigh Valley community. Among the honored guests were former Allentown Democratic State Representative James P. Ritter and former Macungie Republican State Representative Marian E. Markley whom jointly sponsored state legislation allowing breweries with out-of- state ownership to locate in Pennsylvania. Also in attendance were the Board of County Commissioners George Stahl, Donald Hoffman, and Harley Steward Jr. whom can be tagged as the public officials most responsible for granting major concessions to the brewery in exchange for its relocation into the Allentown- Lehigh Valley region of Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, negatively, we can describe a litany of environmental and financial problems that these concessions have directly or indirectly left the good old boys of the Allentown-Lehigh Valley region in both the short and long- range as the region enters the second half of the 1980’s. And, as they say, those who play with fire are bound to get burnt. With that having been said, allow us to ask the good people of South Carolina this important question --- What measures did you take to prevent the Monsieur’ s from Mack from leaving your community high and dry when your special enticement programs come to an end? Additionally – How prepared were you for the possible influx of new people into your community? And, for that fact, was your already existing building stock and utility infrastructure prepared to meet any problem that occurred due to this new fixed reality? The fact being, it is not public policy of the United States to restrict its citizens from traveling or choosing to relocate any where in this common economic market of North America known as the United States of America for pursuit or continuance of economic security. The implication being, the moment we lose this right we also forfeit our status as free human beings. Indeed – We are told there is a time and method to every enterprise, but just the same, man is greatly troubled by ignorance of the future and what it will bring --- industrial development in one area, industrial abandonment the next. |
